Design research as a variety of second-order Cybernetic practice by Sweeting, B.
De
si
gn
 t
he
or
y 
Co
nC
ep
ts
 in
 s
eC
on
D-
or
De
r 
Cy
be
rn
et
iC
s
572
 ConstruCtivist Foundations vol. 11, n°3
second-order Cybernetics
Design research as a Variety 
of second-order Cybernetic practice
Ben Sweeting • University of Brighton, UK • r.b.sweeting/at/brighton.ac.uk
> Context • The relationship between design and science has shifted over recent decades. One bridge between the 
two is cybernetics, which offers perspectives on both in terms of their practice. From around 1980 onwards, draw-
ing on ideas from cybernetics, Glanville has suggested that rather than apply science to design, it makes more sense 
to understand science as a form of design activity, reversing the more usual hierarchy between the two. I return 
to review this argument here, in the context of recent discussions in this journal regarding second-order science 
(SOS). > problem • Despite numerous connections to practice, second-order cybernetics (SOC) has tended to be as-
sociated with theory. As a result, SOC is perceived as separate to the more tangible aspects of earlier cybernetics in 
a way that obscures both the continuity between the two and also current opportunities for developing the field. 
> Method • I review Glanville’s understanding of design, and particularly his account of scientific research as a design-
like activity, placing this within the context of the shifting relation between science and design during the develop-
ment of SOC, with reference to the work of Rittel and Feyerabend. Through this, I summarise significant parallels 
and overlaps between SOC and the contemporary concerns of design research. > results • I suggest that we can see 
design research not just as a field influenced by cybernetics but as a form of SOC practice even where cybernetics is 
not explicitly referenced. > implications • Given this, design research offers much to cybernetics as an important ex-
ample of SOC that is both outward looking and practice based. As such, it bridges the gap between SOC and the more 
tangible legacy of earlier cybernetics, while also suggesting connections to contemporary concerns in this journal 
with SOS in terms of researching research. > Constructivist content • By suggesting that we see design research as an 
example of SOC, I develop connections between constructivism and practice. > Key words • Science, design research, 
second-order cybernetics, second-order science, practice, Ranulph Glanville.
introduction
« 1 » in recent years there has been a re-
surgence of interest in cybernetics amongst 
designers. This has been prompted in part 
by the increased availability and affordabil-
ity of technologies with which to augment 
the environments we design, and those we 
design in, which has fuelled interest in ideas 
regarding interactivity. While this techno-
logical focus is an important aspect of what 
cybernetics offers design, the relations be-
tween the two fields run much deeper. These 
connections have been explored explicitly in 
the work of ranulph Glanville (1999, 2006a, 
2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2009a, 2011a, 
2014b, 2014c), whose work i use as a point 
of departure in this article.1
1 | together with neil spiller, Glanville su-
pervised my Phd research, and although this 
article has been developed after his passing, it is 
significantly influenced by my conversations with 
him. in addition to his work, on the relationship 
between cybernetics and design see also: dubber-
« 2 » drawing on Gordon Pask’s (1976) 
conversation theory and the common char-
acterisation of design in terms of conver-
sation (such as by schön 1991), Glanville 
(2007c, 2009c) has suggested a close anal-
ogy between cybernetics and design, un-
derstanding both as “essentially construc-
tivist” activities (Glanville 2006a: 63; 2013). 
The parallels Glanville draws are significant 
enough for him to claim that “cybernetics is 
the theory of design and design is the action 
of cybernetics” (Glanville 2007c: 1178).
« 3 » While part of Glanville’s motiva-
tion in developing the connection between 
ly & Pangaro (2007, 2015); Fischer (2015); Fischer 
& richards (2015); Furtado Cardoso Lopes (2008, 
2009, 2010); Gage (2006, 2007a, 2007b); Good-
bun (2011); Herr (2015b); Jonas (2007a, 2007b, 
2012, 2014, 2015a, 2015b); Jones (2014); Krip-
pendorff (2007); Krueger (2007); Lautenschlaeger 
& Pratschke (2011); Lobsinger (2000); Mathews 
(2005, 2006, 2007); Pratschke (2007); ramsgard 
Thomsen (2007); rawes (2007); spiller (2002); 
sweeting (2014, 2015c).
cybernetics and design has been the insight 
that the former might bring to the latter, it is 
an important aspect of his position that the 
converse is also the case: that design can set 
an example to cybernetics in terms of prac-
tice and so inform it, not just vice versa. Thus 
the relationship between cybernetics and 
design is to be understood as one of mutual 
overlap and support and, as such, one that 
avoids the difficulties that can follow from 
the application to design of theories external 
to it (a problem that seems to recur in archi-
tecture in particular) and the more general 
shortcomings that can follow from our ten-
dency to see the relation of theory and prac-
tice as predominantly the application of the 
former to the latter (Glanville 2004a, 2014a, 
2015; see also sweeting 2015c).
« 4 » More specifically, Glanville’s un-
derstanding of design as being the action 
of cybernetics is part of his characterisation 
of second-order cybernetics (soC) as be-
ing concerned with how cybernetics is to be 
practiced rather than, as can tend to be the 
case, a theoretical reflection on this (Glan-
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ville 2011b; sweeting 2015b). This concern 
was particularly evident during his time as 
President of the american society for Cy-
bernetics (asC), during which he often re-
ferred to Margaret Mead’s (1968) challenge, 
delivered in her address to the inaugural 
asC conference, to practice cybernetics in 
line with its own ideas. While the princi-
pal legacy of Mead’s remarks has been the 
epistemological concerns of soC, as devel-
oped by Heinz von Foerster (1995, 2003a) 
and others, their original context is that of 
the practice of the society itself. it is this 
aspect to which the asC returned during 
Glanville’s presidency, in terms of both the 
form and content of its conferences, which 
explored cybernetics’ relation to practice 
using conversational, cybernetic, formats 
(Baron et al. 2015; Glanville 2011b, 2012; 
Glanville, Griffiths & Baron 2014; Glanville 
& sweeting 2011; van ditmar & Glanville 
2013).2
« 5 » in contrast to this understanding 
of its relation to practice, andrew Picker-
ing (2010: 25f) has characterised soC as a 
turn away from the more tangible modes of 
experimentation in earlier phases of cyber-
netics, and towards the linguistic. This view 
can be countered: soC is a reflection on 
the performative involvement of observ-
ers within their observations, in contrast 
to the separation of observer and observed 
in conventional science. This is very much 
in line with Pickering’s own emphasis, for 
example in his comments on r. d. Laing’s 
psychiatry as taking seriously “the idea that 
we are all adaptive systems, psychiatrists 
and schizophrenics alike” (ibid: 8) or his 
reference to Pask’s account of the “partici-
pant observer,” who tries to maximise in-
teraction with what he or she observes in 
order to explore it (ibid: 343f).
« 6 » However, even its advocates must 
admit that soC can run the risk of becom-
ing overly introverted, especially given its 
central concern with self-reference. recent 
thinking regarding von Foerster’s develop-
ment of soC has addressed this concern by 
2 | see also the recent special issue of this 
journal on alternative conference formats, which 
was inspired in part by these asC conferences 
(Hohl & sweeting 2015; regarding the asC con-
ferences, see especially: richards 2015; sweeting 
& Hohl 2015).
understanding it as the beginnings of a re-
search programme rather than as primarily 
a form of worldview, and as prompting the 
“new course of action” suggested in this jour-
nal under the heading of “second-order sci-
ence” (sos) (Müller & Müller 2007; Müller 
2008, 2011; riegler & Müller 2014).3 in this 
light i suggest that Glanville’s understanding 
of design, and particularly his (1999, 2014c) 
account of the relation between design and 
science that i discuss below, allows us to 
view the currently expanding field of design 
research as a contemporary variety of soC 
practice, whether soC is explicitly invoked 
or not.4 My purpose in doing so here is not 
primarily to add to what soC can bring to 
design research, which has been explored in 
depth elsewhere by many others. rather, my 
focus is on what design can bring to cyber-
netics, in line with what i have understood as 
being part of Glanville’s own motivations for 
developing this analogy, as noted above. de-
sign research offers an example of how soC 
can develop as a practice-based and outward 
looking enquiry, while also suggesting a way 
of integrating the legacy of tangible experi-
mentation from earlier cybernetics with its 
contemporary concerns.
Method and practice 
in design and research
« 7 » during the period of scientific and 
technological optimism that followed the 
second World War, there was a tendency, as 
evident in what is usually referred to as the 
design methods movement, to see design as 
something that should be put on rational 
3 | see also http://www.secondorderscience.
org
4 | Given that cybernetics stresses the inter-
dependency between acting and understanding, 
and so between theory and practice (see e.g., 
Glanville 2014a; sweeting 2015c), i could equally 
refer to design research as a contemporary variety 
of second-order cybernetics as to one of second-
order cybernetic practice. nevertheless, i feel it is 
important to stress the practical here, given that 
soC, and constructivism generally, currently risk 
being seen more as a worldview than an active re-
search tradition.
scientific foundations.5 since around 1980 
this view has been countered by arguments 
that have seen design as a discipline in its 
own right and so as being of the same sta-
tus as science rather than something to be 
corrected by it. amongst these, the account 
that Glanville (2014c) presented at the 1980 
Design: Science: Method conference, later 
expanded as the journal article Researching 
Design and Designing Research (1999), is 
particularly strongly framed, reversing what 
had been the more usual hierarchy. rather 
than seeing design research as one specific 
form of scientific research, Glanville argues 
that, instead, we can see science as a specific 
form of design enquiry. This follows from 
the way that scientific research inevitably in-
volves design activity, for instance in devis-
ing and setting up experiments, but not vice 
versa.6 design is, it follows, the more general 
case and, therefore, “it is inappropriate to re-
quire design to be “scientific”: for scientific 
research is a subset (a restricted form) of 
design, and we do not generally require the 
set of a subset to act as the sub subset to that 
subset any more than we require [that] the 
basement of [a] building is its attic” (Glan-
ville 1999: 87f).
« 8 » This argument and others like it 
around that time, such as those put forward 
by Bruce archer (1979), nigel Cross (1982) 
and donald schön (1991), consolidate a shift 
during the 1970s from trying to base design 
on the scientific method to the idea that it 
has its own epistemological foundations, 
independent of science (for an overview of 
this shift, see Cross 2007b). The attempt to 
order design according to a linear version of 
the scientific method, understood as mov-
ing from analysing the problem at hand to 
testing and optimising solutions to it, failed 
for reasons that seem obvious in retrospect: 
because design involves the creation of new 
situations, design questions cannot be fully 
formulated in advance but shift and change 
as they are explored and as proposals are en-
5 | see for instance: alexander (1964); 
Broadbent & Ward (1969); simon (1996). For a 
critical discussion of the design methods move-
ment, see Gedenryd (1998).
6 | This is not to say that designers do not 
make use of scientific research but that doing so is 
not essential to what design is, whereas design is a 
core aspect of research and so science.
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acted. one of the most important accounts 
of these limitations is that developed by de-
sign theorist Horst rittel, who, writing with 
the urban designer Melvin Webber, char-
acterised the situations that designers en-
counter as “wicked problems,” the complex 
interdependencies of which make them un-
solvable using conventional linear problem 
solving (rittel 1972; rittel & Webber 1973, 
1984).
« 9 » on the face of it, rittel and Web-
ber’s observations mark an incompatibil-
ity between design and science in terms 
of method. indeed the exhaustion of the 
design methods movement by the 1970s 
– with leading figures such as Christopher 
alexander (1984), John Christopher Jones 
(1984) and, indeed, rittel distancing them-
selves from it – along with the unravelling 
of modernism more generally during that 
decade, marks something of a parting of 
the ways between design and science (ar-
chitecture, for instance, would increasingly 
turn towards history and philosophy, rath-
er than science, for theoretical support). 
However, given Glanville’s soC-inspired 
argument noted above, this separation be-
tween design and science is not what we 
might expect. if science is a limited form of 
design, then is it not the case that scientific 
approaches should be commensurable with 
design, even if not a basis for it? This ap-
parent disjunction is only the case if we fol-
low the changes in how design was thought 
about during this period without also fol-
lowing the comparable changes regarding 
science.
« 10 » design research and the philoso-
phy of science broadly parallel each other 
over this period. Both move from a concern 
with method in the 1960s through a critique 
of this in the 1970s to new foundations 
from the 1980s onwards, focusing on what 
designers and scientists actually do in prac-
tice rather than on what seems ideal in the-
ory. as noted above, this led to design being 
seen as a discipline in its own right (archer 
1979), with its own “designerly ways of 
knowing” (Cross 1982) and a refocusing 
from methodology to broader and more 
practice-based concerns, under the heading 
of design research (for an overview, see for 
instance: Grand & Jonas 2012; Michel 2007; 
rogers & Yee 2015). in the context of sci-
ence, there was a comparable turn during 
the 1970s and 1980s towards understanding 
it in terms of the social and material agency 
of research as practiced, with the growth 
of the fields of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (ssK) and science and technol-
ogy studies (sts), such as in the work of 
Karin Knorr Cetina, david Gooding, Bruno 
Latour and Pickering amongst others (for 
an overview see Pickering 1992). These ac-
counts are suggestive of a more designerly 
paradigm in science, in line with Glanville’s 
argument. indeed, accounts of experimen-
tation in ssK/sts can be read almost as if 
describing the activities of a design studio; 
see for instance: Gooding (1992), Pickering 
(1993, 1995) and Knorr Cetina (1992), who 
even uses a direct analogy with architecture.
« 11 » in this light, what appears to be a 
rupture between design and science during 
the 1970s is instead a close parallel. indeed, 
key critiques advanced in each area – that 
of rittel in design, and that of Paul Feyer-
abend (1970, 1982, 1993) in science – have 
similar content. rittel and Feyerabend were 
colleagues at uC Berkeley while they were 
developing their ideas. Both were influ-
enced by thinking in cybernetics and sys-
tems at that time. rittel worked with ross 
ashby at the ulm school of design (Fischer 
& richards 2015), while Feyerabend (1982: 
64) refers to “new developments in systems 
theory,” which was flourishing at Berkeley 
(which was also home to C. West Church-
man) and elsewhere in California at the 
time (where Gregory Bateson, amongst 
others, was based), and his (1982: 18) com-
ments regarding participant observers re-
flect contemporaneous preoccupations of 
soC.
« 12 » science, like design, involves cre-
ating new ideas and understanding; there-
fore, as in design, the criteria and methods 
that are appropriate will change as part of 
the process and cannot be defined in ad-
vance if science is to progress:
“ …to ask how one will judge and choose in as 
yet unknown surroundings makes as much sense 
as to ask what measuring instruments one will use 
on an as yet unknown planet. standards which 
are intellectual instruments often have to be in-
vented, to make sense of new historical situations 
just as measuring instruments have constantly to 
be invented to make sense of new physical situa-
tions.” (Feyerabend 1982: 29)
« 13 » Feyerabend’s (1970, 1993) re-
ductio ad absurdum argument against the 
predefined methods that were characteris-
tic of the philosophy of science at the time 
concludes by showing that the only criteria 
that can be given in advance, that will not 
inhibit scientific progress, is that “anything 
goes.” This also appears in rittel and Web-
ber (1973: 164), while rittel (1972: 393) 
has “everything goes”: because designers 
inevitably encounter new and ambiguously 
defined situations (it being the purpose 
of design to create the new), they have no 
well-defined problems to solve or enumer-
able lists of options to pick from and “any 
new idea for a planning measure may be-
come a serious candidate” (rittel & Webber 
1973: 164). This phrase is also anticipated 
by theatre director Joan Littlewood (1964: 
432) in describing the Fun Palace project, 
on which cybernetician Pask was a key col-
laborator along with architect Cedric Price 
(see e.g., Lobsinger 2000; Mathews 2005, 
2006, 2007; spiller 2006: 48–50), and that 
is equally concerned with the in-principle 
unpredictable. Furthermore, Feyerabend’s 
(1982: 202) comment that the proponents of 
scientific theory are out of touch with scien-
tific practice echoes the situation in design, 
where design methods had become an aca-
demic game divorced from practice, as both 
alexander (1984: 309) and Jones (1984: 26) 
point out.7
« 14 » While archer (1979) differen-
tiated design as a third disciplinary pole 
with the same status as the traditional “two 
7 | as one of the anonymous reviewers of this 
article suggests, the shift away from science in de-
sign can be thought about in terms of a search for 
forms of rigor that make sense in a design context, 
such as for example those described by schön 
(1988). Feyerabend’s (1982, 1993) argument, 
however, indicates that the scientific method as 
it had been promoted was unsatisfactory not just 
in making sense of design but also in accounting 
for scientific practice itself (Feyerabend demon-
strates that examples commonly regarded as para-
digmatic by the advocates of method violate the 
methodological principles they propose). That is, 
in this period, the need for an understanding of 
rigor that makes sense in the context of practice 
is a feature not just of design but also science. 
Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for prompting 
my thoughts on this point.
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cultures” of the arts and sciences (snow 
1961), Glanville (2014c) argues against this 
separation and, instead, characterises all re-
search as being a design-like activity. This 
designerly continuity across different fields 
is, however, obscured by popular misrep-
resentations of science as a logical and pre-
dictable activity, such as are perpetuated in 
the structure of traditional scientific papers, 
which Peter Medawar (1996) has critiqued 
as a fraudulent account of what scientists 
actually do in practice. Glanville (2014c: 
111) calls for honesty about how research 
is practiced in all disciplines, and suggests 
that this will make similarities clear between 
apparently quite different fields. in this, 
Glanville reflects a willingness to transcend 
disciplinary boundaries that is characteristic 
of cybernetics’ origins, which had cut across 
distinctions between research fields as well 
as those between objectivity and subjectivi-
ty, human and machine, and mind and body.
« 15 » in stressing the continuities be-
tween design and other disciplines, Glan-
ville (2014c) contrasts his account with 
that of archer (1979), whose positioning 
of design in terms of its own disciplinary 
pole, separate to the arts and the sciences, 
risks isolating it from other research tradi-
tions. Glanville’s understanding, however, 
still gives design research the special sta-
tus of archer’s account: given the paral-
lels he draws between design and research, 
Glanville recognises design research as a 
self-reflexive activity of researching research 
(Glanville 2014c: 116–119). That is, as de-
sign is a core part of research activity, to re-
search design is to inquire into an aspect of 
research activity itself. in so doing, Glanville 
anticipates recent discussions in this journal 
regarding second-order science (sos) as 
research activity focused on research itself 
(Müller & riegler 2014a, 2014b; riegler & 
Müller 2014). i return to this below.
Design research and 
second-order cybernetics
« 16 » soC was developed in the con-
text of the shifts in understanding science 
and design that i have summarised above, 
and parallels these concerns. as such, soC 
sits in a pivotal position within cybernetics’ 
wider history. in consolidating its episte-
mology and, with it, an ability to address rig-
orously the issues of self-reference towards 
which a field concerned with circularity is 
inevitably drawn, it is with soC that cyber-
netics reaches maturity as a discipline. That 
this happens simultaneously with the frag-
mentation of the field during the 1970s – 
under pressure from changes in the external 
funding climate and professional accredita-
tion (umpleby 2003; umpleby & dent 1999) 
– has consequences not just for the ideas of 
soC but also for how we understand earlier, 
and other, aspects of cybernetics.
« 17 » Firstly, as the earlier work oc-
curred before the maturity of the field, it is 
inevitable that it contains inconsistencies in 
epistemology, approach and terminology. 
This is further complicated by the way that 
the fragmentation of the field is often as-
sociated with the emergence of critiques of 
science and technology during the 1970s, of 
which soC is one instance. soC has often, 
for this reason, been presented in contrast 
to first-order cybernetics (FoC), which 
tends to be associated with the earlier work. 
The “first” and “second” should not, howev-
er, be understood as implying a sequence or 
the surpassing of one by the other.8 rather, 
soC is specifically the application of cyber-
netics to itself – “the cybernetics of cyber-
netics,” as von Foerster (2003b: 302) titled 
Mead’s (1968) paper.9
« 18 » The terminology of “first” and 
“second” can obscure the continuity be-
tween soC and earlier cybernetics. While 
Glanville has spent considerable effort in 
8 | While Fischer and richards (2015), right-
ly point out considerable overlaps between the 
development of soC and rittel’s characterisation 
of first- and second-generation design methods, it 
should be remembered that “first” and “second” 
are used in different ways in each context.
9 | This development was both necessary 
for the field to consolidate its own disciplinary 
foundations, and has also made possible inno-
vatively reflexive research programmes that are 
of particular interest in exploring those ques-
tions regarding cognition, society, epistemology 
and ethics that inevitably involve self-reference. 
For a fuller discussion of soC see e.g.: Glanville 
(1997, 2002, 2004c, 2011b, 2013); Müller & Mül-
ler (2007); Müller (2008, 2011); scott (2003, 2004, 
2011); Foerster (1995, 2003b); Foerster & Poerk-
sen (2002).
distinguishing the two (e.g., Glanville 1997, 
2004c), he has also recognised that cyber-
netics always involves second-order con-
siderations and did so even at its origins 
(Glanville 2013: 28) and that “it would be 
better, nowadays, to talk only of Cybernet-
ics, without orders: thus bringing the differ-
ent approaches into proximity” (Glanville 
2002). This is certainly the case for Mead 
and Bateson, whose backgrounds in anthro-
pology involved a consideration of the par-
ticipation of observers in what they observe 
(see e.g., their discussion in Brand, Bateson 
& Mead 1976), and for ashby in his (1991) 
understanding of the black box system as in-
volving the observer as part of it. Even nor-
bert Wiener, according to Pask (as reported 
by Glanville 2002; 2013: 33), recognised 
that there were further steps to take in de-
veloping the subject. indeed, alvin toffler’s 
(1970) Future Shock, a book that is emblem-
atic of the criticisms of science and technol-
ogy that are often assumed to apply also to 
cybernetics (e.g., Lobsinger 2000: 134), is 
anticipated two decades earlier in the simi-
lar, cautionary account of technological 
change in Wiener’s (1950) Human Use of 
Human Beings. in addition, while Pickering 
(2010) sees soC as being in contrast to the 
tangible modes of exploration of the earlier 
cybernetics in which he is interested, the 
performative quality of the devices through 
which Pask, ashby, Grey Walter and oth-
ers explored their ideas is an example of the 
participation of observers in observation on 
which soC reflects and places value.
« 19 » secondly, it is difficult to judge 
the consequences of soC for practice, as 
the field within which these implications 
would have been explored had broken up 
by the time the possibility of doing so had 
emerged. The tendency of soC to be largely 
theoretical in orientation – which leads 
Pickering (2010: 25f) to view it as a form of 
linguistic turn – needs to be understood in 
this context of a lack of opportunity for ex-
perimental work.
« 20 » With the break up of cybernetics, 
many of its ideas were absorbed back into 
its constituent fields. some research in other 
disciplines, such as for instance robotics or 
complexity, can be recognised as a continu-
ation of its ideas and research programme, 
including its performative approach to ex-
perimentation (see, for instance, the discus-
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sion of rodney Brooks, stephen Wolfram 
and stuart Kauffman in Pickering 2010: 
60–64, 156–170). Given its continuities with 
cybernetics, as introduced in part above and 
discussed further below, the field of design 
research can be thought of, similarly, as one 
such successor field.10
« 21 » There is a longstanding history 
of connection and influence between cy-
bernetics and design, as has been summa-
rised by Hugh dubberly and Paul Pangaro 
(2015). in particular, ashby and Pask both 
engaged directly with design.11 ashby lec-
tured at the ulm school of design with rit-
tel (see Fischer & richards 2015) and was 
also a significant influence on alexander.12 
Pask, meanwhile, became increasingly in-
volved in architecture from the 1960s on-
wards. He was a significant contributor 
to the prominent Fun Palace project with 
Price and Littlewood, and collaborated with 
nicholas negroponte at Mit, for whose Soft 
Architecture Machines (negroponte 1975) 
he contributed a chapter. in addition he 
held a consultant position at the architec-
tural association in London, wrote explic-
itly on architecture and design (Pask 1963, 
1969) and influenced the development of 
interactive architecture through negropon-
te and others such as John and Julia Frazer 
(Frazer 1993, 1995; Furtado Cardoso Lopes 
2008, 2009; spiller 2006: 204–210). More 
recently, figures such as Pangaro, Glanville 
and Klaus Krippendorff, influenced par-
10 | By “successor field” i do not mean to im-
ply any sense of superiority, but rather the inheri-
tance of ideas.
11 | other figures could also be mentioned. 
dubberly and Pangaro (2015) and Müller and 
Müller (2011) also stress the interest of Heinz 
von Foerster in design. He addressed design au-
diences (e.g., Foerster 1962) and was connected 
to figures such as architect Lebbeus Woods and 
stuart Brand, who can be mentioned in his own 
terms as a cross-over figure. Fischer (2015) has 
suggested connections between Wiener and re-
cent work in design, while the work of Bateson, 
who introduced Brand and von Foerster to each 
other, is a point of reference for contemporary 
discussions of architecture and ecology (see e.g., 
Goodbun 2011; rawes 2013).
12 | although, as upitis (2013: 504f) notes, 
alexander’s (1964) use of ashby’s ideas can be 
questioned.
ticularly by ashby (Krippendorff) or Pask 
(Glanville, Pangaro), have made promi-
nent contributions in both design research 
and cybernetics, while many others have 
worked in one field in a way informed by 
thought in the other.
« 22 » as well as this continuity of peo-
ple, there is a significant continuity of ideas 
and approach such that cybernetics can be 
thought of as design’s “secret partner in re-
search” (Glanville 1999: 90f). While this is 
not the place for a full discussion of these 
parallels – i defer here to the accounts of 
Glanville and the others who i have cited – 
key points include the following:
  There is a conversational, and so cyber-
netic, structure that is central to what 
is distinctive about the way designers 
work (see for instance schön’s (1991: 
76) characterisation of design in terms 
of a “reflective conversation with the 
situation”). Glanville has developed 
this parallel to the extent that, as i have 
noted, he claims that “cybernetics is the 
theory of design and design is the action 
of cybernetics” (2007c: 1178) while it is 
also what lies behind his (1999, 2014c) 
characterisation of research in terms of 
design, as discussed above.
  Both design and cybernetics are con-
cerned with the new, as supported by 
the tendency of conversation to involve 
invention at every turn. Both are “essen-
tially constructivist” activities (Glanville 
2006a: 63; see also: Glanville 2006b; 
2013; Herr 2015b) that enable a form of 
“forward-looking search,” as Pickering 
(2010: 18) has described cybernetics, 
developing new ideas and possibilities 
rather than looking to correspond to, or 
replicate, the real or the optimal.
  The way that designers use drawings 
and models for exploring ideas rather 
than as representations of them (Glan-
ville 2009b) resonates closely with the 
performative nature of the work of Pask 
and others, who played out their ideas 
using physical, experimental devices in 
much the same way (as emphasised in 
Pickering’s (2010) account). in contem-
porary practice-based design research, 
some work has strong continuity with 
the sorts of devices made in earlier 
cybernetics (e.g., that of Mette ram-
sgard Thomsen (2007), Jennifer Kanary 
nikolov(a)13 or ruairi Glynn14), but 
even the use of more analogue media 
(such as the sorts of pen drawings with 
which i work; see sweeting 2014) has a 
similar attitude to modelling as part of 
thinking rather than as a representation 
of thought.
  design research is often concerned with 
epistemological questions regarding 
the interrelations of designers, other 
stakeholders, working methods and the 
knowledge embedded in what is de-
signed. This has often been articulated 
in terms of differences between research 
about/into, through/by and for design, 
following Frayling (1993) and others, 
and as reviewed and synthesised by Jo-
nas (2012, 2015a, 2015b). These distinc-
tions distinguish between that research 
which looks at design from the out-
side or which is applied to it, from that 
which is conducted as an integral part 
of it. This resonates strongly with soC 
concerns regarding the participation of 
observers in their observations, and the 
active difference made by how this par-
ticipation is configured. Jonas (2007b, 
2012, 2015b) in particular has explic-
itly used the framework of cybernetics, 
drawing on Glanville (1997), to clarify 
these points. i return to this below.
  design is a self-reflexive activity in 
much the same way as cybernetics, both 
involving circular reflective processes 
and being examples of disciplines that 
can be applied to themselves, in the de-
sign of design or the cybernetics of cy-
bernetics.
« 23 » While design research and cy-
bernetics mostly differ in their subject 
matter, the above parallels are significant. 
They share both ways of working – a con-
versational forward-looking search and 
an interactive, non-representational use of 
modelling – and also core concerns with 
observer positions and self-reflexivity in 
the constitution of their research processes. 
These parallels hold to the extent that, while 
design research continues to make reference 
to cybernetic ideas (for instance in exploring 
the possibilities of new technologies (e.g., 
13 | http://www.labyrinthpsychotica.org/
Labyrinth_Psychotica
14 | http://www.ruairiglynn.co.uk
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ramsgard Thomsen 2007; spiller 2002), or 
in understanding the relationship between 
research and design (e.g., Jonas 2007b, 2012, 
2014, 2015a, 2015b), i suggest we can also 
understand it as a contemporary variety of 
cybernetic research, whether the connec-
tions with cybernetics are made explicitly 
or not. seeing design research as an exam-
ple of soC in this way suggests a continuity 
between the epistemological focus of soC 
and the tangible experimentation of earlier 
cybernetics, a connection that can easily be-
come obscured, as is evident in Pickering’s 
(2010) account.
second-order science
« 24 » as well as helping integrate the 
more practice-oriented legacy of early cy-
bernetics with soC, design research can 
also provide an important point of reference 
for contemporary discussions of sos, which 
have been a recent focus of this journal (and 
which have led to the present special issue). 
Karl Müller and alexander riegler (2014a) 
proposed sos as “a new course of action” in 
order to reinvigorate soC – and construc-
tivist approaches generally – as an active 
research field. They characterise sos as a 
reflexive form of research, either in meth-
odological terms through the inclusion of 
observers as participants (a direct continu-
ation of von Foerster’s (1995, 2003a) soC as 
the “cybernetics of observing systems”), or 
through self-reflexive domains of research, 
in the sense of the science of science or, 
similarly, the cybernetics of cybernetics or 
the sociology of sociology, such as through 
meta-analyses of the products or practices of 
other scientific enquiry.
« 25 » Müller and riegler position sos 
as a specific research agenda within the 
significant transformations currently un-
derway in the landscape of science (Müller 
2008, 2011; Müller & riegler 2014b). These 
have partly been, as noted above, in terms 
of how science has come to be understood 
in terms of its practice by fields such as ssK 
and sts, but also through significant chang-
es in this practice itself. This has included: 
a change of focus away from a mechanistic 
and reductionist paradigm (associated with 
newton and descartes) towards one based 
in complexity, adaptation and evolution, 
which rogers Hollingsworth and Müller 
(2008) have labelled in terms of a transi-
tion from science i to science ii; significant 
changes in the organisational structure of 
knowledge production, with an increased 
emphasis on its social robustness and the 
context of application, which has been la-
belled as a shift from Mode 1 to Mode 2 (see 
nowotny, scott & Gibbons 2006); and grow-
ing interest in transformative and transdis-
ciplinary aspects of research (e.g., nicolescu 
2012; schneidewind & augenstein 2012).
« 26 » These various changes in science 
have all had the effect of science moving to-
wards a more designerly paradigm, in line 
with Glanville’s (2014c) argument discussed 
above (as noted by Jonas 2014, 2015a). 
Given this convergence and the historical 
and conceptual connections that i reviewed 
above, there is reason to consider sos as a 
potential point of interchange between de-
sign and science. This is especially so given 
that there is a considerable overlap between 
core interests of design research and the 
two “motivations” for sos that Müller and 
riegler (2014a: 2f) have put forward: self-
reflexivity, and the inclusion of observers.
« 27 » Firstly, self-reflexivity is impor-
tant in design research in various ways. in 
a general sense, designers often do this im-
plicitly as they work, reflectively redesigning 
their design processes to suit the specifics of 
the situations they encounter. More explicit-
ly, design is a field that, like cybernetics, can 
be applied to itself in the sense of the design 
of design. This includes such instances as: the 
design of particular design methods (e.g., 
alexander 1964) or of technologies with 
which to design (e.g., Frazer 1995; negro-
ponte 1975; or contemporary developments 
such as building information modelling); 
the way that a design research conference is 
something that itself needs to be designed 
(durrant et al. 2015; sweeting & Hohl 2015); 
and the way that the products of design can 
allow for a continuation of the design proc-
ess in them, such as in the architecture of 
Price (as Price 2003: 136 himself remarks).
« 28 » specific design projects can also 
explore aspects of design itself, as for in-
stance in Peter downton’s (2004) practice-
based reflections on epistemology, or the 
work of Peter Eisenman (Bédard 1994). in-
deed, Eisenman’s Cannereggio project, for 
instance, can be considered a meta-analysis 
in Müller and riegler’s (2014b) sense for the 
way it takes Le Corbusier’s unbuilt venice 
Hospital scheme for the same site as its start-
ing point.
« 29 » Most significantly for sos, un-
derstanding design as a core part of research, 
as per Glanville’s (2014c) account discussed 
above, positions design research as a field of 
researching research. This observation holds 
possibilities yet to be fully explored, offering 
design research a field of application in sci-
ence rather than vice versa, as is more often 
the case.
ben sweeting
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and the Bartlett, UCL. In his PhD, supervised by Neil Spiller and Ranulph Glanville and funded 
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« 30 » secondly, as noted above, the 
position of the observer has been a theme 
of particular importance in design research 
as part of the field’s shift from its mostly 
professional origins to being seen in more 
academic terms. This has included careful 
delineations between ways in which design-
ers and others observe and participate in 
design, and of the ways in which material 
artefacts operate variously as part of the re-
search process, as the object of enquiry, as 
output or dissemination and sometimes as 
more than one of these depending on their 
context. as noted above, one important and 
widespread way in which these distinctions 
have been made is by distinguishing in terms 
of research about/into, for and through/by 
design. as Jonas (2012: 34) discusses, the 
value of this sort of categorisation is that it 
differentiates on the basis of the attitudes 
and intentions of designers, rather than in 
terms of subject matter (which would not 
make sense in design because of its tenden-
cy towards diverse and ambiguously deline-
ated content). This has helped clarify where 
design is used actively as a research process 
to explore a topic (through/by), where sepa-
rate research is applied in design, such as 
in research and development or market re-
search (for) and where design is the object of 
separate study by another discipline, such as 
history or sociology (about/into). in elabo-
rating on and clarifying these distinctions, 
which were initially rather ambiguous, Jonas 
has drawn on Glanville’s (1997) description 
of different observer positions and orienta-
tions as a foundation, associating research 
through with the engaged soC observer, and 
for and about with the detached observer of 
FoC. Jonas distinguishes a new category of 
research as design to correspond to where, 
in Glanville’s scheme, the observer is inside 
the inquiring system and looking inwards, 
and interprets this in terms of “design as the 
inaccessible medium of knowledge produc-
tion” and the role of abductive reasoning 
(Jonas 2015b: 35).15
15 | Given Glanville’s (1997) enigmatic si-
lence regarding this category, it makes sense to 
associate it with the role of tacit knowledge in de-
sign, especially when seen in the context of Jonas’s 
(2015a, 2015b) presentation of these categories in 
terms of their relations with each other. Locating 
the tacit here can help clarify the relation between 
« 31 » Categorisations of this sort are 
very much in the spirit of soC and are 
highly relevant for sos; and we can think 
of research for, about/into, through/by and 
as in this context in much the same way as 
in design. it is the observer-included modes 
of research through/by and as that are of 
most relevance (these being associated with 
soC). Examples include Glanville’s ap-
proach to conference design in terms of us-
ing cybernetic processes (so the content of 
the conference can be acted out in its form; 
Glanville 2011b; sweeting & Hohl 2015) 
and the performative aspects of the devices 
of Pask and others, as stressed by Picker-
ing (2010). The more detached modes of 
research about/into or for also have their 
counterparts, and would include historical 
and theoretical work, including this present 
article and also accounts such as that of 
Pickering and others to which i have re-
ferred.16
« 32 » While Jonas has used the termi-
nology of FoC and soC to give a founda-
tion to these designerly categories, in turn 
they offer complementary possibilities back 
to cybernetics. Whereas the phrasing of 
FoC and soC invites a sharp distinction in 
terms of whether the observer is included 
or not, and can be confusingly interpreted 
in terms of a chronological sequence as dis-
cussed above, the categories of for, about/
into, through/by and as distinguish some-
thing of the nature of an observer’s involve-
ment, not just the acknowledgement of it, 
enabling these different observer positions 
to be seen in productive combination. This 
latter point is important for sos, especially 
where it is conceived in terms of reflexive 
operations such as meta-analyses, as it re-
quires a close relationship to the more con-
ventional first-order science on which it is 
to operate (Müller & riegler 2014b).
the research involved in any design act and re-
search through design, which is in need of more 
explicit articulation, even if this could still be 
through various media or embedded in artefacts.
16 | note that to write about soC is a first-
order activity. This is why neither von Foerster 
(2003b: 301) nor Glanville (2002) see the need for 
any third or fourth orders of cybernetics; these 
would simply be instances of its first or second 
orders.
« 33 » Given these significant overlaps, 
design research is a productive point of 
comparison for sos. in particular, it sug-
gests a possible example for how sos can 
be constituted as a research field that is 
practice based and outward looking, both 
aspects that are important in this “new 
course of action” (Müller & riegler 2014a). 
This is partly through the connections be-
tween soC and earlier, more tangible, 
forms of cybernetics that are suggested by 
design research, and also through examples 
of research through design, which is nota-
ble for the way that even some of its most 
abstracted and introverted moments retain 
rich potential for concrete connections with 
the world.
Conclusion
« 34 » i have drawn on the continuities, 
both of concepts and participants, between 
soC and the field of design research in or-
der to position soC in terms of practice 
rather than as a mainly theoretical perspec-
tive. i have drawn, in particular, on Glan-
ville’s (2014c) account of scientific research 
as a form of design activity, understanding 
this in the context of the shifting relation-
ship between design and science during the 
formative period of both soC and design 
research, and since.
« 35 » i have suggested that design re-
search is not just a field that is influenced 
by soC but a contemporary variety of it, 
whether this connection is made explicitly 
or not, in a similar way that other fields can 
be regarded as continuing or reinventing 
cybernetic concerns. understanding design 
research in this way suggests a continuity 
between the epistemological concerns of 
soC and the material experimentations of 
earlier cybernetics, in contrast to the way 
that soC is sometimes regarded as a turn 
away from these more tangible qualities.
« 36 » These connections with cyber-
netics’ past are also relevant to contempo-
rary discussions of sos. Given that design 
research shares the central concerns of sos 
with both self-reflexivity and the inclusion-
of observers as active participants, it is sug-
gestive of ways in which sos may develop 
as a field of research.
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Design Cycles: Conversing 
with Lawrence halprin
Tom Scholte
University of British Columbia, 
Canada • tom.scholte/at/ubc.ca
> Upshot • This commentary adds envi-
ronmental architect Lawrence Halprin 
to Sweeting’s list of examples of design 
research as second-order cybernetic 
practice.
« 1 » Ben sweeting’s target article pro-
vides an informative outline of the con-
ceptual confluences of design research and 
second-order cybernetics, explicit and oth-
erwise, as they have unfolded over the last 
several decades. a practitioner absent from 
sweeting’s summary (and from any other 
cybernetic overview of design practice of 
which i am aware) whose work might be 
fruitfully included in this analysis is envi-
ronmental architect Lawrence Halprin. This 
oPC will endeavor to provide a brief sketch 
of the second-order cybernetic features 
of Halprin’s rsvP cycles in the hopes that 
they may find their way into the ongoing 
discourse on the cybernetics of design that 
sweeting has framed.
« 2 » in the 1960s, while second-order 
cybernetics was incubating in Heinz von 
Foerster’s Biological Computer Laboratory, 
architect and environmental designer, Hal-
prin, in collaboration with his wife ann, 
choreographer and artistic director of the 
san Francisco dance Workshop, were en-
gaged in their own inward examination 
of group creative processes in search of a 
theory outlining their main features. similar 
to ranluph Glanville, Halprin explicitly re-
jected “the attempt to make a science out of 
community design” claiming that…
“ [h]uman community planning cannot ever 
be a science anymore than politics can rightly be 
called political science. science implies codifica-
tion of knowledge and a drive toward perfectibil-
ity none of which are possible or even desirable in 
human affairs.” (Halprin 1969: 4)
What Halprin did desire was a “means to de-
scribe and evoke (creative) processes on other 
than simply a random basis” in the hopes that 
it “would have meaning not only for (the) field 
of environmental arts and dance-theatre, but 
also for all the other arts where the elements 
of time and activity (particularly of numbers 
of people) would have meaning and useful-
ness” (ibid: 1). it may be argued that, in his 
own way, Halprin may also have been looking 
for something one might call “rigour,” but not 
as a means of justifying design’s place in the 
academy on intellectual grounds. He simply 
wanted to help people work more efficiently 
on a purely pragmatic level and, at the same 
time, avoid the undesirable outcomes of a 
narrowly linear, dare call it “scientific,” ap-
proach to the transcomputable complexities 
inherent in any and all design processes. He 
formalized his findings in the 1969 book The 
RSVP Cycles: Creative Processes in the Human 
Environment, describing a recursive schema 
of iteration and evaluation bearing striking 
resemblances to the conversational concep-
tion of second-order cybernetics.
« 3 » Below are the four components of 
the rsvP cycles as defined in Halprin’s book 
(ibid: 2):
“ R – Resources which are what you have to work 
with. These include human and physical resources 
and their motivation and aims.
S – Scores which describe the process leading to the 
performance.
V – Valuaction which analyzes the results of action 
and possible selectivity and decisions. The term 
‘valuaction’ is one coined to suggest the action-
oriented as well as the decision-oriented aspects of 
v in the cycle.
P – Performance which is the resultant of scores 
and is the ‘style’ of the process.”
open peer Commentaries
on ben sweeting’s “Design research as a Variety
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« 4 » While the arrangement of the acro-
nym rsvP (the request for a response) was 
chosen for its elegance in naming an essen-
tially conversational process (ibid: 2), a typi-
cal iteration of the cycle would more accu-
rately be expressed as rsPv: the articulation 
of an inventory of the resources available, and 
desirable, for inclusion in the project, the ar-
ticulation of a score indicating what is to be 
done with/to the resources, the performance 
(implementation) of the score, and a period 
of valuaction during which the results of the 
performance are evaluated and re-enter the 
next iteration of the cycle as new resources, 
for which a new score will be articulated.
« 5 » From a second-order cybernetic 
perspective, it is significant that the “moti-
vations and aims” of all of the individuals 
involved in the project must also be articu-
lated and taken into account in addition to 
the purely physical or financial resources at 
play. This is, in fact, the ethical foundation of 
the entire schema, as “its purpose is to make 
procedures and processes visible, to allow 
for constant communication and ultimately 
to insure the diversity and pluralism neces-
sary for change and growth” (ibid: 5). This 
ethical foundation seems entirely commen-
surate with the “desirable ethics” of Glanville 
(2004b).
« 6 » Halprin opens his book with a 
definition of scores:
“ scores are symbolizations of processes which ex-
tend over time. The most familiar kind of ‘score’ is 
a musical one, but i have extended this meaning 
to include ‘scores’ in all fields of human endeavor. 
Even a grocery list or a calendar, for example, are 
scores.” (Halprin 1969: 1)
“ The essential quality of a score is that it is a 
system of symbols which can convey, or guide, or 
control (as you wish), the interactions between el-
ements such as space, time, rhythm, and sequenc-
es, people and their activities and the combina-
tions which result from them.” (ibid: 7)
« 7 » Halprin goes on to expand his list 
of sample scores to include plans for build-
ings, mathematics, stage directions and dia-
logue for a play, navajo sand paintings, the 
intricacies of urban street systems as well 
as plans for transportation systems and the 
configurations of regions, and much more. 
The most significant feature of any score is 
its position on a spectrum from “open” to 
“closed” in terms of the amount of control 
it exerts.
“ The real nub of the issue […] is what you 
control through the score and what you leave to 
chance; what the score determines and what it 
leaves indeterminate; how much is conveyed of 
the artist-planner’s own intention of what is to 
happen and to what degree what actually happens 
and the quality of what actually happens is left to 
chance; the influences of the passage of time; the 
variables of unforeseen and unforeseeable events, 
and to the feedback process which initiates a new 
score.” (ibid: 7)
« 8 » as to the performance phase of 
the rsvP cycles, an analogy between sci-
entific experimentation and the perform-
ing arts employed by philosopher robert 
Crease might help further position Halprin’s 
schema at the intersection of design research 
and second-order cybernetics described by 
sweeting. Crease tells us that “the structure 
of performance is essentially the same in the 
theatre arts and experimental science” when 
we consider that “[p]erformance involves 
the conceiving, producing, and witnessing of 
actions in order to try to get something that 
we cannot get by consulting what we already 
have.” in both domains, “the representation 
(theory, language, script) used to program 
the performance does not completely de-
termine the outcome (product, work), but 
only assists in the encounter with the new” 
(Crease & Lutterbie 2010: 165). of course, the 
phenomena generated by both experimenta-
tion and performance might well differ sig-
nificantly from the expected outcome. Larry 
richards reminds us that is is the dynamics of 
performance that account for these potential 
suprises and, in the spirit of second-order cy-
bernetics, open up new horizons of possibil-
ity to be explored in a subsequent iteration.
“ Formal languages remove the dynamics ab-
solutely; in fact, the value of formalism is that it 
removes the dynamics to leave a skeleton of con-
straints to guide action and performance (like a 
script or score) […] a poem, a piece of music, 
a play, and their performance are ways to use 
a language to play with dynamics. They don’t 
cause things to happen; they trigger a dynamics 
of interaction that can lead to new distinctions. 
Contradictions and paradoxes become desirable 
as avenues to new ideas, new alternatives, new 
choices.” (richards 2010: 16)
« 9 » For Glanville, the second-order cy-
bernetic conception of design is in direct op-
position to the “slogan” in modern architec-
ture, attributed to Louis sullivan, that “form 
follows function” (Glanville 2007b: 88). The 
level of complexity in most design challenges 
calls for another approach entirely.
“ rather than try to specify every requirement 
and every relationship between these require-
ments, and then find an optimal solution, design 
starts more or less ‘aimlessly’ and gradually con-
structs an ‘evolving’ form that not only changes 
but, in doing so accommodates the required func-
tions also, often in a novel and surprising man-
ner, where normal relations between functions 
are enriched or even replaced by new ones that 
are unexpected, different, and often very good!” 
(Glanville 2007c: 1196)
« 10 » Glanville tells us that “the draw-
ing, sketch or doodle” is “central to the pro-
cess of design” and that “[t]hese are often 
made without much purpose” (ibid: 1179). 
Throughout his corpus, Glanville sings the 
praises of purposelessness and the “gifts” 
that it can bring; a position that might seem, 
to some, to be at odds with the goal-directed 
preoccupations of cybernetics. it is, how-
ever, yet another theoretical commitment 
shared by Halprin, who claimed that “be-
coming goal oriented is “one of the gravest 
dangers that we experience” through our 
tendency to pursue social goods, based on 
“incontrovertibly ‘good ideas,’” by “the most 
direct means possible” resulting, through an 
“oversimplified approach […] in the chaos 
of our cities and the confusion of our poli-
tics (or other politics – fascism and commu-
nism are clear statements of this approach)” 
(Halprin 1969: 4).
“ When ekistitcians, for example, say that the 
‘search for the ideal is our greatest obligation’ 
they are making the same basic error that all goal-
oriented thinking does – a confusion between 
motivation and process. We can be scientific and 
precise about gathering data and inventorying re-
sources, but in the multivariable and open scor-
ing process necessary for human lifestyles and 
attitudes, creativity, inquantifiable attitudes and 
openness will always be required.” (ibid.)
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« 11 » if, as Halprin suggests, the “confu-
sion of our politics” is equally a result of a 
flawed design process that is too dependent 
on narrowly defined goals and insufficiently 
sensitive to feedback, then, perhaps, it is not 
going too far to expand Glanville’s audacious 
claim that science is but a subset of design 
and make a similar claim regarding gover-
nance; a term that is, after all, also common-
ly understood to be virtually synonymous 
with the term “cybernetics.” a conception 
of governance informed by the kind of sec-
ond-order cybernetic approach to design 
espoused by Glanville and encapsulated 
in sweeting’s article would have no option 
but to acknowledge openly the inevitability 
of error and eliminate the peddling of sup-
posedly iron-clad, fool-proof “solutions” in 
which the politicians of every liberal de-
mocracy currently traffic. and where might 
that lead us? But that is a conversation for 
another time.
« 12 » sweeting’s article does valuable 
work in consolidating Glanville’s legacy of 
design cybernetic theorization as it evolved 
alongside a growing awareness within the 
design research community that first-order, 
non-reflexive “scientific” models are insuffi-
cient to deal with the emergent functional, 
aesthetic and ethical complexities of ac-
tual design practice. This provides a robust 
foundation from which a whole generation 
of cybernetic designers influenced by Glan-
ville (Thomas Fischer, Candy Herr, Michael 
Hohl, tim Jachna and others) can further 
develop and disseminate this rich body of 
theory and practice to the generations to 
come. as a theorist/practitioner who in-
dependently evolved a recursive, conver-
sational approach to design so thoroughly 
embodying the ethical commitments of 
second-order cybernetics, an additional re-
flection upon the work of Halprin has much 
to offer this on-going endeavour.
tom scholte is an actor/director/writer for theatre and 
film whose work has been seen at such film festivals 
as Sundance, TIFF, Rotterdam and the Berlinale. His 
research focuses on cybernetics in the Stanislavski 
System of Acting and narrative drama as a modeling 
facility for the study of complex social systems.
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Understanding Design from 
a second-order Cybernetics 
perspective: is there a place 
for Material Agency?
David Griffiths
The University of Bolton, UK 
d.e.griffiths/at/bolton.ac.uk
> Upshot • This commentary supports 
Sweeting’s case for the relationship be-
tween the design tradition, second-order 
cybernetics and second-order science. It 
argues, however, that the extension of 
this argument to other intellectual tradi-
tions and areas of practice is complicated 
by differing views of material agency.
« 1 » The main focus of Ben sweeting’s 
target article is to examine the terms “design” 
and “second-order cybernetics,” together 
with the practice designated by them, and to 
discuss their relationship. This task is simply 
described, but leads inexorably into deep 
waters, in part because of the entangled re-
lationship between the terms, and in part be-
cause both terms are contested. in the main, 
sweeting navigates this complexity with skill, 
but inevitably there are loose ends in the ar-
gument, which are worth pulling on to see if 
they lead to further insight.
« 2 » The argument is founded on sweet-
ing’s analysis of ranulph Glanville’s ideas on 
design and second-order cybernetics (soC), 
a task that he is particularly well-positioned 
to undertake, given his long relationship with 
Glanville as both a student and a collaborator. 
sweeting cites Glanville as stating that “cyber-
netics is the theory of design and design is the 
action of cybernetics” (§2), and reports that 
“Glanville […] characterises all research as 
being a design-like activity” (§14) and that he 
“recognises design research as a self-reflexive 
activity of researching research” (§15). on the 
basis of Glanville’s work, exemplified by the 
above quotations, sweeting makes the core 
proposal of the article, suggesting that
“ Glanville’s understanding of design, and par-
ticularly his […] account of the relations between 
design and science […], allows us to view the cur-
rently expanding field of design research as a con-
temporary variety of soC practice.” (§6)
This proposal is both well-founded and use-
ful.
« 3 » i also find Glanville’s argument 
regarding the relationship between science 
and design, and sweeting’s discussion of it, 
to be convincing: “design is, it follows, the 
more general case and, therefore, ‘it is inap-
propriate to require design to be ‘scientific’: 
for scientific research is a subset (a restricted 
form) of design…” (§7). The argument is in 
line with the critique made by authors such 
as stuart umpleby (2014) and Karl Müller 
(2014), who have contributed greatly to sec-
ond-order science (sos), to which sweeting 
dedicates a substantial section. This critique 
focuses on the important role of the scientist 
as an observer and active constructor of the 
scientific process, a role that is systemati-
cally erased from positivist accounts of sci-
entific activity.
« 4 » sweeting thus establishes two 
alignments: between design research and 
soC, and between design and sos. The 
question that arises in the reading of the 
article is the degree to which it is possible 
to extrapolate from the alignment between 
these discourses in order to draw conclu-
sions that are applicable to science as it is 
carried out beyond the cybernetic tradition 
and to design that is carried out without a 
reflexive turn.
« 5 » When Glanville spoke about de-
sign, he did so not as an external observer 
surveying the field, but as a participant 
explaining his experience of the process 
of design (including his design of musical 
environments and performances). indeed, 
given the view of cybernetics that he sus-
tained and lived by, we should not expect 
anything less. sweeting does not discuss 
Glanville’s practice but implies that it was in 
line with Horst rittel’s argument that “‘ev-
erything goes’: because designers inevitably 
encounter new and ambiguously defined 
situations (it being the purpose of design to 
create the new), they have no well-defined 
problems to solve or enumerable lists of 
options to pick from” (§13), and that the 
problems encountered by designers are 
“wicked” (§8) because of their complex in-
ter-dependencies. Much design practice is 
illuminated by an analysis conducted from 
this position, but many design problems 
are perceived by designers in much simpler 
terms, and are not seen as being wicked. 
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The Chambers dictionary definition of the 
verb “design” is “to develop or prepare a 
plan, drawing or model of something be-
fore it is built or made,” and readers will be 
able to confirm that other dictionaries have 
similar definitions. This definition includes 
many contexts where designers are con-
vinced that they are working with well-de-
fined problems, and that enumerable lists 
are available, including much of the field of 
engineering. a reading of sweeting’s article 
with a focus on this issue is complicated 
by the fact that the logic of the argument 
leads to thematic sections that discuss both 
design research (which necessarily has a 
reflexive aspect) and design (which, in the 
view of many practitioners, does not neces-
sarily involve a self-reflexive aspect).
« 6 » The designers of scientific instru-
ments such as the CErn particle collider 
have a well-defined goal, in this case to pro-
vide an apparatus capable of detecting the 
Higgs Boson. But even in design that does 
not involve engineering, well-defined prob-
lems can be identified. The builders of musi-
cal instruments provide a good example of 
designers who have well-defined problems 
with lists of options. iris Bremaud describes 
the choice of woods for construction in the 
case of the designers of xylophones and slit-
drums in africa:
“ Many species could be encountered in either 
xylophones designed for temporary use, or slit 
drums with strong aesthetical meaning, involv-
ing the ability of wood to be intricately carved 
[…]. on the contrary, the more prominent the 
purely ‘acoustic’ function of instruments was, the 
higher the proportion of use of Pterocarpus […]. 
This choice is nearly exclusive in most elaborate 
xylophones and in slit-drums that were used for 
message transmission – up to more than 10 km 
distances.” (Bremaud 2012: 812)
These designers are clearly making choices 
from a list of predefined options, and de-
ploying their design expertise in making the 
trade-off between the contrasting benefits 
of different materials and the range of pre-
defined purposes to which the instrument 
will be put.
« 7 » in a rather different musical con-
text, Brian Eno, often described as a sound 
designer, also explains the act of creating a 
musical composition in terms of selection:
“ What the composer had was a kind of menu, a 
packet of seeds, you might say. and those musi-
cal seeds, once planted, turned into the piece. and 
they turned into a different version of that piece 
every time.” (Eno 2011)
Eno relates this approach to the influence of 
stafford Beer, and perhaps this cybernetic 
connection should not be surprising given 
the importance of selection in cybernet-
ics since the early work of Claude shannon 
(1948).
« 8 » The purpose of this digression into 
music, a field that was one of Glanville’s main 
areas of activity, is to argue that there exist 
design practices that are well-defined, in-
volve selection from a list of pre-determined 
options, or both. i suggest, therefore, that 
sweeting’s characterization of design is best 
seen as an accurate description of a particu-
lar type of design. it may also be an argument 
and exhortation to other designers who do 
not share these ideas or practice to consider 
more deeply the recursion involved in their 
design activity, and i believe that this was the 
intention of much of Glanville’s work. The 
question arises, however, how far (if at all) it 
is possible to make a convincing argument 
about design in general on the basis of this 
soC analysis to those who do not share the 
epistemological position of the field, a chal-
lenge that is common to soC as a whole. i see 
sweeting’s discussion of andrew Pickering as 
being central to this question.
« 9 » sweeting cites Pickering exten-
sively, and mostly with approval. However, he 
disagrees with Pickering’s characterization of 
soC as “a turn away from the more tangible 
modes of experimentation that characterized 
earlier phases of cybernetics, and towards the 
linguistic.” sweeting counters this argument 
by pointing out that “soC is a reflection on 
the performative involvement of observ-
ers within their observations” (§5), but that 
the opportunity to carry out this function 
was limited because the field of cybernet-
ics had “broken up” (§19) by the time that 
soC emerged. i have some sympathy with 
this view, but nevertheless i believe that it is 
incumbent on those who feel there is value 
in the heritage of cybernetics to investigate 
Pickering’s point more deeply. specifically, 
we need to assess the degree to which the risk 
that sweeting identifies that soC can become 
“overly introverted” (§6) may have played an 
active part in the break up of the field. sweet-
ing’s concern is not to conduct such an inqui-
ry into the decline of cybernetics, but rather 
to explore how its legacy can be applied and 
revived in design research. nevertheless, i be-
lieve that there is a key point at issue here, as 
i now discuss.
« 10 » The examples that are given of 
Pickering’s performative approach can in-
deed be situated within soC (r. d. Laing’s 
work on therapists, Pask and the participant 
observer). But there are many aspects of Pick-
ering’s thinking about the performative that 
are not easily situated in this way. Pickering 
describes his conception of the performative 
as an “…image of science, in which science is 
regarded as a field of powers, capacities and 
performances, situated in the machinic cap-
tures of material agency” (Pickering 1995: 7). 
in his book The Mangle of Practice, Pickering 
examines the history of the bubble chamber 
in physics research. He argues that we should 
see this as a “dance of human and material 
agency” (ibid: 51). Pickering goes on to de-
scribe how…
“ [r]esistance (and accommodation) is at the heart 
of the struggle between the human and material 
realms in which each is interactively restructured 
with respect to the other – in which, as in our ex-
ample, material agency, scientific knowledge, and 
human agency in its intentional structure and its 
social contours, are all reconfigured at once.” 
(ibid: 67)
Here, i think, is the heart of the problem of 
the generalizability of insights from soC. 
The idea that the object of investigation (or 
design) has material agency that pushes back 
at the scientist (or designer) is one that sits 
uncomfortably with an soC view of con-
structivism, and certainly of the radical con-
structivist tradition within soC as exempli-
fied by Ernst van Glasersfeld (1995). to put 
it another way, the conception of the perfor-
mative within design research as described 
by sweeting, and perhaps within soC as 
a whole, may be different from that which 
Pickering proposes.
« 11 » in my view, soC does not neces-
sarily preclude the ascription of agency to the 
material world. For example, the reformu-
lation of the scientific method undertaken 
by Humberto Maturana (1990: 18) implies 
constraints on our ability to engage with the 
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agency of the material, but it does not pre-
clude its existence, and is compatible with 
Pickering’s “mangle of practice.” The analysis 
proposed by sweeting, however, does not en-
compass the agency of the material. He does 
mention “the ways in which material arte-
facts operate variously as part of the research 
process, as the object of enquiry, as output or 
dissemination and sometimes as more than 
one of these depending on their context” 
(§30), but there is nothing to suggest that the 
physical world “pushes back” at the designer, 
or even that such a thing might be possible. i 
do not see this as a problem for the analysis 
proposed by sweeting per se, as the design 
practice described may indeed consist of a 
recursive interaction between the designer, 
the design and the people for whom it is in-
tended. Moreover, from a radical constructiv-
ist perspective, it may be argued that the per-
ception of material agency is no more than a 
perception, and that a methodology based on 
this is intellectually misleading and practical-
ly unreliable. it does, however, raise a prob-
lem for the claim that design is a category that 
subsumes science. sweeting’s argument that 
scientific activity is a kind of design holds for 
a broad definition of design, but the specifi-
cally soC view of design put forward in this 
article does not map well onto mainstream 
conceptions of science. The same applies 
even to first-order cybernetics in the perfor-
mative mode, for example for Grey Walter, 
whose robotic “tortoises” addressed a well-
defined problem: “to model goal seeking and, 
later, learning. But he did so as economically 
as he could” (Boden 2006: 244). The problem 
of mapping from design to science can be re-
solved in one of two ways. one option is to 
broaden our understanding of design so that 
it includes material agency, in line with Pick-
ering’s mangle of practice. This would enable 
the insight from soC into the role of the de-
signer in a recursive process of construction 
to be generalized across the whole range of 
scientific and design activities. alternatively, 
we can make it clear that we are adopting a 
critical view of science, engineering and craft. 
This would embrace the differences between 
different types of design and scientific prac-
tice, and challenge practitioners to question 
the externality of the material agency that 
they ascribe to the surrounding environ-
ment and independent of themselves. There 
is indeed a role for such a practical critique. 
sweeting refers to “pre-defined methods that 
were characteristic of philosophy of science” 
in the 1970s, but a glance around the bodies 
funding research today would show that this 
preference for pre-defined methods is alive 
and kicking.
« 12 » divergent opinions on the perfor-
mative may in turn account for sweeting’s 
disagreement with Pickering on the linguistic 
turn in soC. sweeting comments that “soC 
is a reflection on the performative involve-
ment of observers within their observations” 
(§5). However, material agency is at the core 
of Pickering’s view of the performative but is 
not represented in design seen from a soC 
perspective, as represented in this article. 
Consequently, from Pickering’s perspective 
soC is lacking an account of material agency 
and its effects, whereas sweeting does not 
discuss any such lack. it is the discrepancy 
on this lack, i suggest, that leads Pickering 
to identify a linguistic turn in soC, and also 
leads sweeting to disagree with him.
« 13 » in conclusion, the important con-
tribution of this article is to bring together 
and extend the thinking of Glanville, and to 
show how this can both inform design re-
search and serve as “continuing or reinvent-
ing cybernetic concerns” (§35). in doing this, 
sweeting offers a much-needed response to 
the lack of practical research being carried 
out within soC, a concern that Glanville also 
shared. in doing this, the article also raises 
important issues, going beyond its main fo-
cus, about the nature of the relationship be-
tween second- and first-order cybernetics 
and the possible role of material agency as a 
point at issue in the understanding of the per-
formative in these two aspects of cybernetics.
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what Can Cybernetics 
Learn from Design?
Christiane M. Herr
Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool Univ., China 
christiane.herr/at/xjtlu.edu.cn
> Upshot • Based on Sweeting’s central 
question of what design can bring to cy-
bernetics, this commentary extends and 
adds further depth to the target article. 
Aspects discussed include the nature of 
practice in relation to design, the intro-
duction of designerly ways of acting and 
thinking through acting to cybernetics, 
and the re-introduction of material ex-
perimentation typical of early cybernetics.
Differentiating externally motivated 
application and internally 
motivated practice
« 1 » Ben sweeting’s focus on the rela-
tionship of cybernetics and design presents 
a valuable counterpoint to recent attempts 
at renewing interest in cybernetics by fram-
ing it primarily in reference to science (§24). 
Based on ranulph Glanville’s (2007c: 1178) 
characterization of design as the action of 
cybernetics, and cybernetics as the theory of 
design, sweeting positions design research 
as a variety of second-order cybernetic 
(soC) practice (§4). This central point of 
sweeting’s article deserves further strength-
ening, as practice is not to be understood 
in this context as the application of theory 
(§§6–10). as argued by sweeting based on 
Glanville (2014a, 2015) (§3), soC should 
not be conceived of as a theory preceding 
and determining subsequent action. When 
seen from the perspective (and experience) 
of design, theory is more appropriately un-
derstood as a framework for making explicit 
thoughts developed in and through action. 
While generated from action, such a theory 
can then also be used for abstract argument 
and analysis, but this should not be seen as 
its primary purpose. design reasoning is 
typically implicit: a form of thinking imma-
nent in, expressed, and developed through 
acting. This is illustrated in donald schön’s 
(1991) well-known characterization of de-
sign processes as reflection in action. it is 
this recognition of the fundamental involve-
ment of the observer in the process that sets 
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design (and cybernetics, specifically soC), 
apart from the sciences, as sweeting shows 
(§14).
« 2 » Cybernetic descriptions of pro-
cesses frequently revolve around goals, in 
particular the pursuing of goals within cir-
cular processes (ashby 1957). While such 
processes may be described from the per-
spective of an outside observer identifying 
purposeful actions, it makes much more 
sense to shift perspective to that of the in-
volved inside observer. From the perspec-
tive of the involved observer, goals appear 
more flexible, as they are deliberately se-
lected, often temporary, and typically sub-
ject to change in response to various con-
straints encountered in the process of acting 
(Fischer & richards 2015; Glanville 2007c). 
Consideration of this constructed and pro-
cess-oriented nature of goals is essential 
when aiming to understand the actions of 
designers. With goals as well as ways to pur-
sue them being the subject of choices, the re-
sultant cybernetic process relies strongly on 
personal values and ethics. in the context of 
cybernetics, this observation has led Heinz 
von Foerster (1992) to distinguish what he 
termed in principle undecidable questions – 
questions that cannot be decided objectively 
or from an external perspective. This is well 
known by designers, who must rely on per-
sonal values for much of their decision mak-
ing (trimingham 2008), as any kind of de-
sign practice involves questions of an ethical 
nature. While designers rarely make this ex-
plicit, cultivating personal values forms part 
of what can be described as design rigour, in 
reference to conventional scientific research. 
This observation may lead to further exami-
nation of the role of personal ethics in cy-
bernetic practice.
the pleasure of constructing the 
world
« 3 » While design may be understood 
as describing a particular kind of process 
(§§12, 22), it may be argued that design is 
also, and perhaps most importantly, a way of 
thinking and perceiving the other (Glanville 
2007c: 1197). This way of thinking and per-
ceiving cultivates not only keen awareness of 
the what is but also of the what could be. to 
designers, the world is always a constructed 
world (Herr 2015b), where self and other are 
dynamically merged: this worldview may be 
described as much as an analytical one as an 
aesthetic-appreciative and constructive one. 
From this perspective, it becomes obvious 
why designers are typically flexible in their 
employing of a wide spectrum of tools and 
methods, ranging from science to art. En-
gaging with the other in this manner initi-
ates conversational processes of exploration 
that may be started by premeditated goals, 
but are in essence driven by perceptions of 
potential and possibility. i would argue that 
cybernetic processes may be understood in 
a similar manner.
« 4 » While designers construct their 
realities, they tend to pay little attention to 
the nature of the world in which they con-
struct their realities (Glanville 2006a; Herr 
2015b). When engaged in explorative pro-
cesses of designing, designers typically cast 
away theoretical preconceptions in favour 
of what is found to be practically viable in 
a given particular situation. What matters 
most is the immediate response of the other 
generated from action, and the changes 
in thinking and perception this response 
in turn generates in the designer. design-
ers construct realities through processes 
of informed participation, which resonates 
with radical constructivist theory (Glanville 
2006a) as well as Margaret Mead’s call for 
cybernetically informed ways of acting (§4).
« 5 » although designers are usually 
comfortable acting, they are not necessar-
ily comfortable or able to make explicit 
the nature and mechanics of the processes 
in which they engage. This generates chal-
lenges when communicating beyond spe-
cific instances of design processes and es-
pecially beyond disciplinary boundaries. in 
addition, the implicit nature of designing 
makes it difficult to discuss design processes 
in educational settings. it is here where i see 
great potential for integrating the formal 
rigour of the cybernetic body of thought 
with action-oriented design. as sweeting 
has argued (§14), cybernetic vocabulary 
was specifically developed to transcend dis-
ciplinary boundaries and is well suited to 
supporting designers in describing, perhaps 
also in fine-tuning, their acting. in addition 
to transcending cross-disciplinary bound-
aries in this manner, i would argue that 
design-cybernetic perspectives can also help 
in transcending cross-cultural boundaries, 
as i have previously discussed (Herr 2011).
Cybernetic machines for thinking 
and showing
« 6 » sweeting (§22) points out that 
material experimentation, as it happened in 
earlier cybernetics, could inform similar ex-
perimentation in contemporary soC to al-
low it to be more outward looking (§33). in 
this respect, cybernetics could adopt tech-
niques well honed in design, where mod-
els are employed not only for purposes of 
representation or prediction, but mainly to 
support the exploration of ideas (§22). For 
a design-based variety of cybernetic prac-
tice, the continuation of making automated 
models of an explorative and performative 
nature seems a particularly fruitful direc-
tion. such machines can be understood to 
be similar to conceptual models in design 
and may be developed based on cybernetic 
themes. Besides the precedents in design 
research discussed by sweeting (§22), there 
are further examples of devices constructed 
in this spirit and relating explicitly to cyber-
netics.
« 7 » over the past 15 years, Thomas 
Fischer and myself have built and document-
ed various – often automated – devices for 
conceptual idea exploration in architecture 
based on cybernetic ideas. We have charac-
terized these devices as machines for showing 
(Herr & Fischer 2013, 2004), intentionally 
sidestepping expectations for prediction or 
immediate applied utility. i have recently 
continued this line of thought with an analy-
sis and discussion of cellular automata mod-
els as they are used in design, where i have 
emphasized the explorative and flexible na-
ture of such models (Herr 2015a). once de-
signers work with tools, they tend to adapt 
them to their own purposes, which results in 
rules being interpreted in a flexible manner 
and tools being used against their intended 
purposes (Fischer & Herr 2007). in a similar 
manner, designers tend to adopt vocabulary 
and theory from various fields other than 
design (§3). What is often not reflected well 
is that such processes of adopting external 
theory and vocabulary should be understood 
as part of creative conversations, in which 
terms are interpreted flexibly and vocabulary 
as well as theory is typically transformed to 
fit a particular design situation.
« 8 » one recent occasion where cyber-
netic devices were presented was an informal 
exhibition held as part of the 2014 annual 
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conference of the american society for Cy-
bernetics, http://asc-cybernetics.org/2014. 
Most of the devices displayed were, however, 
of a representational nature, with only a few 
of the presented items intended to create 
questions or initiate new thoughts. With cy-
bernetics’ growing maturity and increasingly 
complex body of ideas, it seems contempo-
rary cyberneticians are primarily concerned 
with explaining existing principles clearly 
rather than inventing new ones or playing 
with these ideas in an open-ended – and per-
haps messy or incongruent – manner. it is 
this manner of acting and thinking through 
acting in a playful and explorative spirit that 
cybernetics can learn from design.
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> Upshot • I reflect on the theme of 
honesty in research and discuss the ad-
joining requirements of rigor from an 
academic perspective. Central to my dis-
cussion is Glanville’s assertion that what 
researchers – from either science or de-
sign – presented was not what they ac-
tually thought and did.
« 1 » in §14 of his target article, Ben 
sweeting examines ranulph Glanville’s 
concept of honesty. i think the concept of 
honesty, while not being central to the main 
argument of the target article, deserves some 
more reflection, especially in relation to the 
concept of rigor.
« 2 » While “rigor” in research is often 
mentioned, i think its constituents are rarely 
thoroughly discussed. i would like to use 
this opportunity to discuss these further, as 
sweeting’s article allowed me to get a much 
deeper understanding of Glanville’s concept 
of honesty, especially linking it to post-ratio-
nalisation, which i found very enlightening.
« 3 » When i was conducting my Phd 
research at sheffield Hallam university, be-
tween 2003 and 2007, we had regular de-
bates about academic rigor and what consti-
tuted rigor in the research process of artists 
and designers. adopted from research in 
the sciences, the significant terms associ-
ated with rigor, and associated with Phd 
research, were that the research had to be 
“thorough, exhaustive, accurate, and system-
atic.” in art and design critical and reflective 
were often added as well. in our seminars, 
it emerged that “thorough” and “exhaustive” 
were related and could described as together 
forming a “t”-shape: the horizontal line of 
the “t” consisting of an exhaustive, broad 
and comprehensive overview of what is con-
sidered the context of research and related 
practice, while the focus area, the vertical 
element of the “t,” consisting of going deep 
into it and being thorough in one’s own con-
tribution. i assume “objective” might have 
been included in earlier definitions of rigor 
in research in art, design and architecture, 
however in the research of artists, designers 
and architects, the requirement of the term 
might have been abandoned at some time. 
in artistic research, the individual creative 
process involves necessarily subjective, in-
tuitive and explorative phases in which ad-
hering to “objectivity” might be more of a 
hindrance and lead to post-rationalisation. 
More about this below.
« 4 » When we examine the next term, 
“accurate,” meaning “correct in all details” or 
“faithful representation,” it is perhaps to this 
that Glanville’s demand for honesty is most 
related. How may “accuracy” be possible 
from a constructivist perspective? does the 
demand for accuracy refer to observations, 
measurements, models and analysis only? 
Then how might it include a playful explo-
ration, intuitive insights, creative leaps of 
mind, random iterations or doodling con-
versations (Glanville 1999) that may lead 
to new understanding, insights, methods, 
techniques or discoveries? Glanville views 
such creative moments as “[…] pointless, 
undirected, seemingly purposeless, playful 
and dreamy activity that is at the heart of 
design” (Glanville 2006a: 105). When such 
designing is at the heart of research, then re-
search has dreamy and purposeless aspects 
to it. How might these be documented and 
interpreted accurately?
« 5 »  in the spirit of honesty, i would 
like to reflect upon my own Phd research 
process. in retrospect, it had aspects of dou-
ble-bookkeeping: presenting my methodol-
ogy, plans and intentions to my supervisors 
(and myself) accurately, yet the results being 
post-rationalisations. From my own per-
spective, i relied on hunches, connections 
between facts “suddenly” becoming clear, a 
rather unstructured and unclear, sometimes 
“terrifying” process riddled with insecuri-
ties of “poking around in the fog” in order to 
understand what i was learning, make sense 
of it and proceed to a next step. The applied 
methodology emerging quietly almost on its 
own in the background. Later, after comple-
tion, i would end presentations of my Phd 
research with the statement: “told as a story, 
my research appears pretty straightforward 
and top-down. in fact it was bottom-up and 
came together step-by-step over three years. 
The research process was a constant learning 
process.” From that perspective, the written 
thesis did not describe in thorough, “honest” 
detail how new insights emerged, but made 
sense of it in post-rationalisation (Glanville 
1999: 5). For example, even a meticulously 
kept journal would not reveal how exactly 
the grounded theory emerged in the analysis 
of interview data.
« 6 » The following term, “systematic,” 
is in my view the most problematic in the 
research of artists and designers. systematic, 
meaning “acting according to a fixed plan or 
system, methodical.” Following a fixed plan 
in practice-based design research contra-
dicts, in my view, exactly the possibility of 
acting on new insights and diverging from a 
perhaps planned trajectory. it is this creative 
freedom that allows for new connections, 
experiences and discoveries. i believe it lies 
at the heart of research in the creative disci-
plines. Without it, we would be “drawing by 
numbers,” while serendipitous and radically 
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new discoveries would be less frequent. as a 
result, i think “systematic” may be relevant 
to the general overall structure or model1 
of the research process of Phd research 
but should be avoided in the active creative 
phases in which new ideas emerge and solu-
tions are developed.
« 7 » in this context, i ask where the 
“values” in scientific research might enter. 
in artistic research, they often are referred 
to, or better emerge, in a reflective chapter. 
Karl Popper asks why few scientists care to 
write about ethics and values:
“ […] values emerge together with problems; 
that values could not exist without problems; and 
that neither values nor problems can be derived 
or otherwise obtained from facts, though they of-
ten pertain to facts or are connected with facts.” 
(Popper 1976: 226)
« 8 » i would say that it is here where 
a second-order cybernetics perspective 
might provide a valuable contribution to 
avoid the “view from nowhere” (turnbull 
2000: 221). When design research aims to 
answer a research question, a process that 
also involves looking at problems, then this 
should be linked to particular values held 
by the researcher, fundamentally inform-
ing the thinking and acting. However, these 
are rarely made explicit. if this happens this 
usually takes place in a reflective chapter to-
wards the end of the written thesis.
« 9 » i believe that sweeting’s emphasis 
on Karl Müller and alexander riegler’s pro-
posal (§§25f) linking second-order cyber-
netics and design creates a most promising 
direction for both disciplines. This might 
be especially so in view of current develop-
ments in design such as transition design 
(irwin 2015), design for social change and 
user experience design. all three examples 
include theoretical models that inform act-
ing, which may lead to designing intan-
gibles, such as processes, involving (§25) 
complexity, adaptation and evolution, and 
(§26) self-reflexivity and the inclusion of 
observers (§30).
Michael hohl is a designer, design researcher and 
educator. He is interested in how design researchers 
can be educated to develop the well-balanced skills, 
empathy, rigor and intuition necessary to conduct 
their research. Central to his research are “designing 
for all senses,” for designers to consider qualities 
beyond mere usability or visual appeal, taking into 
account all our sensorial modalities, considering 
embodied cognition. Related to this are interests 
in the epistemology of data-visualizations and 
mentoring students in making use of appropriate 
research methods in the context of their research.
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Digital Design research and 
second-order Cybernetics
Mateus de Sousa van Stralen
Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais, Brazil 
mateus-stralen/at/ufmg.br
> Upshot • I claim that the parallels be-
tween design research, second-order 
cybernetics (SOC) and second-order sci-
ence (SOS), as discussed by Sweeting in 
the target article, are more explicit in 
digital design. The discussion of SOC and 
SOS can point towards the creation of 
an epistemological foundation to digital 
design, where self-reflexivity and the in-
clusion of the observer are central ques-
tions.
« 1 » Gordon Pask pointed out “it is easy 
to argue that cybernetics is relevant to ar-
chitecture in the same way that it is relevant 
to a host of other professions; medicine, en-
gineering or law” (Pask 1969: 494). indeed, 
there are several publications about the ap-
plication of cybernetics in design. in the 
target article, Ben sweeting looks at this the 
other way around and proposes that design 
research can contribute to cybernetic think-
ing by suggesting that design research is not 
just a field influenced by cybernetics but is 
a form of second-order cybernetic practice. 
sweeting relies on Glanville’s work to un-
derpin the strong relation of second-order 
cybernetics (soC) to practice and design. 
Through his work, Glanville has shown that 
not only can cybernetics contribute to de-
sign, but that design can also inform cyber-
netics, understanding cybernetics and de-
sign not as separate entities but as a circular 
interwoven process of acting and reflecting, 
theory and practice. The discussion i put 
forward in the commentary is that sweet-
ing’s arguments can be made even more ex-
plicit if we focus on a more specific form of 
design research that is based on digital pro-
cesses – digital design – and look how it is 
practiced. The connections between digital 
design, design research and soC can serve 
as bridge for a new generation of designers 
to access and incorporate radical construc-
tivism in their reflections and actions.
« 2 » in the last decade, there has been a 
growing interest in cybernetics amongst de-
signers, especially young ones, driven by the 
increasing use of digital technologies in de-
sign. Computer programming and its prom-
ise of machine intelligence in the process of 
design,1 manufacturing2 or embedding it in 
the environment3 are part of today’s design 
practice. The development of the different 
digital processes and techniques was mainly 
motivated by transformations in praxis led 
by architects and designers trying to ex-
plore the potential of digital technologies in 
their work. as neil Leach (2012) points out, 
much of the research in digital design was 
done outside the traditional academic en-
vironments. designers had to develop their 
own software and building process to ensure 
the feasibility of their designs,4 and many 
reached out to theories external to design to 
1 | among others, the following ai-based 
techniques are popular: neural networks, genetic 
algorithms, multi-agent systems, evolutionary ar-
chitecture (Frazer 1995).
2 | topology optimization, digital fabrica-
tion, and self-assembling are examples of tech-
niques in which computation is applied to the 
manufacturing process.
3 | in interactive environments and rela-
tional architecture, computation is embedded in 
the environment to enable reactive, interactive 
and dialogical behavior. see, e.g., the works of us-
man Haque, http://www.haque.co.uk, and ruairi 
Glynn, http://www.ruairiglynn.co.uk.
4 | see, e.g., the design companies Gehry & 
Partners and Zaha Hadid architects.
1 | see Hugh dubberly’s “How do you de-
sign: a compendium of models,” http://www.dub-
berly.com/articles/how-do-you-design.html
587
Cybernetics is the Answer  Jose dos santos Cabral Filho
second-order Cybernetics
               http://constructivist.info/11/3/572.sweeting
support their works.5 But as rivka oxman 
(2006: 232) has noted, the impact of digital 
design on practices has resulted in a need for 
a revision of current design theories. Many 
research groups and designers have looked 
to cybernetics to create conceptual frame-
works to guide research and development.
« 3 » digital design research can be 
seen as a subcategory of design research, 
but given the impact of computation in 
designing and in production practices, it is 
evolving to become a unique field in design 
(oxman 2006). in digital design, computa-
tion can be integrated in the total process 
of design, from the initial concept through 
to materialization, production and use. in 
this “digital continuum,” as it is called by 
Branko Kolarevic (2003), design is directly 
connected to materialization, from the 
initial conceptual stages with rapid proto-
typing techniques, to the final object with 
digital fabrication processes and interactive 
systems. The connection between design 
and materialization, research and action 
indicates how the relations between design 
research and cybernetics can be even more 
evident in digital design. it is not a surprise 
that most examples of connections between 
cybernetics and design listed in §21 of the 
target article can be seen as examples of ear-
ly digital design. nicolas negroponte’s Soft 
Architecture Machines (negroponte 1975) 
discusses computer-aided architecture re-
lated to machine intelligence in design. John 
Frazer’s An Evolutionary Architecture (Fraz-
er 1995) investigates form-generating pro-
cesses by considering architecture as a form 
of artificial life. Glanville also had several ar-
ticles related to digital design, such as “Cad 
abusing Computing” (Glanville 1992) and 
“variety in design” (Glanville 1994). Fur-
ther evidence can be found by bringing the 
discussion of the concepts of self-reflexivity 
and the inclusion of the observer into the 
light of digital designing.
« 4 » sweeting discusses how self-reflex-
ivity and the inclusion of the observer can be 
seen as important points of interconnection 
between design research, soC and second-
5 | The special issue of the London journal 
AD on “Folding in architecture” (Lynn 1993) 
has several articles that exemplify how designers 
reached out to theories external to design to sup-
port their works.
order science (sos). self-reflexivity is one of 
the central issues in digital design processes 
today. This becomes more evident in those 
practices where computation is inextricably 
part of the process, such as algorithmic and 
parametric design, in which the designer 
designs computational process to gener-
ate form. The design of the design process 
that generates form gives the idea that form 
is not “given,” but “found.” in the first case, 
data forces shape onto passive matter, and 
in the second case, matter and data inter-
act and give shape. The idea of giving shape 
makes the connections between observer 
and process more explicit, as most designers 
are eager to claim their involvement in the 
process. That is why the inclusion of the ob-
server does not seem to represent a problem 
in design. But in form finding this becomes 
more blurry, as questions can arise as to who 
is responsible for the design. This process, 
which is also called “emergence,” leads to 
a false idea that computers themselves are 
generating autonomous objects. However, 
from an soC perspective, the designer is 
also responsible for the final design because 
form is actually coded in the computer by 
the designer. The observer is included in a 
self-reflexive act of designing design.
« 5 » another point worth being dis-
cussed is the impact of the digital contin-
uum in design. digital fabrication enables 
designers to create short feedback cycles of 
designing, making and reflecting. in that 
context, practice-based research methods 
have become more widely used and accept-
ed, as designers are now able to make high-
end models and products in a fast and ac-
cessible manner through different iterative 
cycles. Either explicit or not, these feedback 
cycles can be seen as examples of cybernetic 
practice, which reinforces sweeting’s argu-
ments.
« 6 » in conclusion, sweeting’s target 
article positions design research as a con-
temporary variety of soC and by doing so, 
establishes the connections between design 
and sos, creating a circular relation where 
one can inform the other. The parallels be-
tween design research, soC and sos can 
be even more explicit in digital design. soC 
and sos can point towards the creation of 
an epistemological foundation to digital de-
sign, where self-reflexivity and the inclusion 
of the observer are central questions.
Mateus de sousa van stralen received a master’s 
degree in architecture from the Federal University 
of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in 2009 and is currently 
a doctoral student at the same university. He is 
the director of KUBUS4D (an architecture office 
focused on digital design) and a researcher at 
LAGEAR (Graphic Laboratory for the Experience of 
Architecture, School of Architecture at UFMG). Based 
on his experience in architecture and urbanism, in 
particular planning and building projects, he focuses 
on the following topics: architecture and digital 
technologies, design process and digital fabrication.
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Cybernetics is the 
Answer, but what was the 
Conversation About?
Jose dos Santos Cabral Filho
Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais, Brazil 
jcabral/at/arq.ufmg.br
> Upshot • It is suggested that the main 
arguments of the target article could be 
constructed in an easier way and would 
become even more compelling if a radi-
cal consideration of the systemic nature 
of design were taken into account.
« 1 »  Ben sweeting’s target article shows 
a genuine and welcome effort to amplify our 
understanding of the relationship between 
design and cybernetics. sweeting explores in 
detail the intricacies of such a relationship, 
presenting a well-argued investigation into 
the possible links between the two fields of 
investigation and looking for a kind of mu-
tualism, exploring the improvement that 
both parts can bring to one another. He does 
so by continuing ranulph Glanville’s life-
long enterprise of clarifying the intertwin-
ing of the two areas, an effort that was often 
made in unusual ways, escaping the conven-
tional idea of applying cybernetics to design.
« 2 » My collaboration in this open 
commentary is to suggest that if a radical 
consideration of the systemic nature of de-
sign were taken into account, the main ar-
guments of the article could be constructed 
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in an easier and simpler way. The question 
of simplicity here is less to attend the prin-
ciple of occam’s razor and more to make 
the arguments even more compelling and, 
therefore, have a greater chance of extend-
ing their practical implications.
Design as an invitation to dialogue
« 3 » There seems to be widespread 
consensus that to consider design under 
the principles of second-order cybernet-
ics is mostly to acknowledge the inclusion 
of the observer and the conversation that 
originates from this acknowledgment. How-
ever, the bibliography on the subject shows 
that most researchers consider the inclu-
sion of the observer to be restricted to the 
design process (the work of designers), and 
sometimes extended to the research into 
the design process (the work of researchers, 
academic or not). This applies to different 
researchers, such as Glanville and donald 
schön, and, in fact, it underlies the target 
article. Most of the time, the issue of the use 
of the designed object does not get much at-
tention, as if the design role had ended with 
the creation of the object. nevertheless, the 
consideration of the object and its use is not 
enough: if we understand the systemic na-
ture of design in a radical way, we have to 
come to terms with the fact that the final 
product of the design chain is not an object 
but a system, in which the object is included. 
acknowledging this will change, concomi-
tantly, the design process and design process 
research.
« 4 » Thus, if we want to push the idea 
of design research as a variety of soC to its 
most interesting limits, we have to consider 
that what we design when designing is not 
merely an object but a larger system that 
includes the object (and in some cases, may 
even prescind from physical objects). That 
may seem common sense, obvious and self-
evident, and, in fact, it is one way or another 
acknowledged by most designers, especially 
by architects (and it is surely indisputable 
amongst cyberneticians).
« 5 » This matter was already high-
lighted by Gordon Pask in his seminal paper 
“The architectural relevance of cybernetics” 
(Pask 1969). it posits, amongst other things, 
that “architects are first and foremost system 
designers,” a reasoning that can be easily ex-
tended to design in general. Pask’s paper is 
certainly one of the most quoted papers in 
relation to cybernetics and architecture/de-
sign, especially due to its unexpected propo-
sition that architecture is more relevant to 
cybernetics than the other way round.
« 6 » However, Pask’s assertion on the 
systemic nature of architecture is not fully 
taken into account by practitioners, if not 
even downplayed. Certainly, several re-
searchers, particularly those with some sort 
of direct link to Pask himself, such as Hugh 
duberly, Paul Pangaro, usman Haque, and 
John and Julia Frazer, have all drawn at-
tention to the groundbreaking aspect of 
Pask’s contention, and have consistently 
tried to develop it further (§21). dubberly 
& Pangaro (2015) even argue that this pa-
per “anticipates donald schön’s notion of 
design as conversation […] and goes fur-
ther than rittel and others who described 
design as a cybernetic process” (dubberly 
& Pangaro 2015: 10). For certain, Pask goes 
beyond schön’s notion of design as conver-
sation, considering that schön, even though 
he pushes the idea of design beyond mere 
problem solving, still regards the design 
process as somehow ending with the ob-
ject. in this way, conversation, in schön’s 
view, ends up been a kind of soliloquy be-
tween the designer and his or her drawings, 
regardless of whether he or she is using 
drawings to articulate ideas and not just as 
a representation. However, it is undeniable 
that schön’s book The Reflective Practitioner 
(1991) turned out to be very influential and 
played a significant role in the general ac-
ceptance of design as conversational outside 
the circle of cybernetics.
« 7 » Thus, on the one hand, we have a 
theoretical recognition of the importance 
of the systemic principle of design, and on 
the other hand, what we can term as a po-
litically correct embracing of democratic 
intentions by designers. The problem is that 
despite this general and diffuse acceptance 
of a systemic approach, we are witnessing a 
continued and excessive focus on the design 
of non-systemic objects that is more and 
more tailored to meet the spectacularization 
of our lives and cities. in other words, we 
see not the use of a dialogical framework in 
the actual practice of design, but a dialogi-
cal discourse superficially applied to design. 
as a matter of fact, a dialogical discourse is 
a contradiction in itself, as discourse is op-
posed to dialogue, as the philosopher vilém 
Flusser (2011: 83) reminds us.
« 8 » The problem with a superficial 
adoption of design as conversation is that 
it can lead to sterile self-reflexive attempts 
such as Peter Eisenman’s Cannereggio proj-
ect, referred to in the target article (§28). on 
the one hand, it is for sure a meta-reflection 
on the design process and apparently it ar-
ticulates an ingenious convergence of the 
three categories of design research – into, 
through and for (§§22, 30). on the other 
hand, its design scenario excludes so many 
layers of the concerns and stakeholders im-
plied on that specific architectural design 
that it becomes a restricted conversation, a 
soliloquy so to speak, that ends up as a self-
ish and exhibitionist exercise, no matter how 
intellectually flamboyant and marketable it 
may be. in other words, it is not enough 
to be self-reflexive and simply engaged to 
explore the full potential of being an soC 
observer. The question is not only about the 
engagement or detachment of the observer; 
it is not only about where we position our-
selves as observers (§30) but also about how 
far we are willing to take the systemic ap-
proach, that is to say, it is about the extent 
and nature of the included observers invited 
to the dialogue.
« 9 » Pask and Price, once more, have 
shown some possible paths to including 
the observer radically with their Fun Palace 
project – a collaboration with Joan Little-
wood (§13). However, it is worth noting 
that the same contradiction regarding Pask’s 
paper – praised but not fully taken into ac-
count – goes for the Fun Palace. it is widely 
reverenced in architectural magazines and 
at exhibitions but it seems to have had little 
practical impact on the production of con-
temporary architecture. The digital design 
trend of recent decades, for example, which 
is based on the design research of the 1970s, 
has promoted a change in practice from de-
signing the object to designing the process 
of designing the object (designing design, 
form-finding, etc.). a radical move would 
change the focus on the object in itself to-
wards a systemic and relational scenario 
where the object exists in its full dialogical 
potential; that move, however, seems unat-
tainable (or possibly, undesirable).
« 10 » Even if we consider the develop-
ment of so-called interactive architecture, 
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the Fun Palace proposition is still far ahead 
of what we have achieved, in spite of the ad-
vances in digital technology at our disposal. 
it seems that, contradicting Price’s famous 
dictum “technology is the answer, but what 
was the question?”, technology is not the 
answer in our present situation. at least not 
technology outside an soC framework. Per-
haps we should bring Price’s dictum up to 
date by saying: cybernetics is the answer, but 
what was the conversation about?
Conclusion
« 11 » a significant advance in design to-
wards a second-order level will come when 
designers embrace an all-encompassing sys-
temic approach that will necessarily have 
the inclusion of the observer, at all possible 
levels, as its pivotal point. if the desire is to 
keep design and design research as a prac-
tical enquiry into openness, as sweeting 
seems to aspire, designers must extend the 
conversational and recursive strategy used 
in the design process towards the creation of 
dialogical objects and the system in which 
they are inserted. to consider design within 
the complexities and seriousness of Pask’s 
conversation theory would allow a radical 
rethinking of design in a way that it would 
necessarily become soC in practice. Then, 
Glanville’s assertion that “cybernetics is the 
theory of design and design is the action of 
cybernetics” (2007c: 1178; §22) would be-
come unequivocal, and design, as well as de-
sign research, would be undoubtedly more 
similar to the tangible experimentation of 
first-order cybernetics, as the target article 
proposes.
Jose dos santos Cabral Filho is an architect 
and Professor at the School of Architecture at 
UFMG (Brazil). He holds a master’s and a PhD 
from Sheffield University and has been a visiting 
scholar at McGill University, NTNU and the RCA. His 
interests range from cybernetics to architectural 
performances, electronic music, play and games.
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(Architectural) Design 
research in the Age 
of neuroscience:  
the Value of the second-
order Cybernetic 
practice perspective
Andrea Jelic´
Independent researcher, Serbia 
jelic.andrea/at/gmail.com
> Upshot • This commentary highlights 
the relevance of understanding design 
research as a variety of second-order cy-
bernetic practice. It does so by illustrat-
ing possible contributions of this view 
to several concrete issues surround-
ing the introduction of neuroscien-
tific framework to architectural design. 
Based on the implications of Sweeting’s 
article, I suggest that the specific case of 
an interdisciplinary dialogue between 
architecture and cognitive science can 
provide a plausible testing ground as a 
new research field for second-order cy-
bernetic practice and second-order sci-
ence.
« 1 » in the context of the increasing in-
terest of neuroscience for architecture and, 
more broadly, evidence-based design, Ben 
sweeting’s target article offers a critical per-
spective for plausible positioning of design 
in such an interdisciplinary dialogue. spe-
cifically, by understanding (architectural) 
design research as a contemporary variety 
of second-order cybernetics, an opportu-
nity arises for tackling potentially crucial 
obstacles to future progress and the useful-
ness of neuroscientific investigations in an 
architectural context. accordingly, the aim 
of this commentary is to highlight the value 
of the target article’s view by examining its 
possible contribution to several crucial is-
sues, including: 
a addressing concerns of prescriptive de-
sign solutions; 
b using the inherent second-order cy-
bernetic structure of design research to 
question the roles of the architect-de-
signer and the scientist in the context 
of experimental studies; and 
c indicating the need for and possibility of 
a new second-order science of interdis-
ciplinary design research framed on the 
basis of cognitive science and phenom-
enology of architectural experience and 
design.
« 2 » Before proceeding, it is important 
to contextualize the commentary’s argument 
and motivations by sketching briefly the 
background and current efforts in the field 
dedicated to investigating the relationship 
between the mind, body, and built environ-
ment through a neuroscientific lens (for a 
comprehensive introduction, see Mallgrave 
2011, 2013). on the one hand, a renewed 
interest in the experiential dimension of 
architecture and a turn toward human-cen-
tred design, and on the other, decades-long 
history of architectural psychology and en-
vironment-behaviour research have created 
conditions for a seamless opening of neuro-
science-architecture dialogue. However, de-
spite promising initial efforts, there is a lack 
of a systematic framework purposely aimed 
at defining and structuring the relationship 
between architectural design and scientific 
insights/evidence. it is in this light that the 
target article’s cybernetic parallels between 
science and design are proposed as a direc-
tion for approaching this important issue.
« 3 » Concretely, the continuity of ideas 
between cybernetics and design research 
as presented by the author (§22) establish 
potential interpretations for neuroscientific 
knowledge-architectural design connection 
at two levels: 
  at the level of design research being 
exercised as a second-order cybernetic 
practice, and 
  at the level of interdisciplinary design 
research as a second-order science.
« 4 » Firstly, the essentially conver-
sational and constructivist nature of the 
design process challenges directly any 
concern for developing evidence-based 
prescriptions for architectural solutions. 
in this sense, any (recurring) attempt to 
“scientise” design through neuroscientific 
methods and inputs – a genuine possibility 
in the age of neuroscience – can be coun-
tered effectively by bringing awareness of 
the cybernetic conditions governing design 
research into this interdisciplinary endea-
vour. Therefore, similarly to the capacity 
of the work of architecture only to trigger 
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and not control the subject’s experience 
(according to the enactive-embodied view, 
Jelić et al. 2016; see also sweeting’s hypoth-
esis of architectural experience as facilitat-
ing second-order inquiry, sweeting 2015a), 
neuroscientific inquiries into the experi-
ence of architecture primarily serve to shed 
light on design knowledge, to relate the in-
tuitive decisions to spatial scenarios, and 
not to modify the design activity as such.
« 5 » secondly, in line with the theory 
of embodied cognition, architectural design 
is in itself an embodied process: it is hy-
pothesized as being a neurological activity 
that always involves embodied metaphori-
cal thinking and multi modal image-mak-
ing (arbib 2013; Mallgrave 2011). indeed, 
reflecting phenomenologically upon one’s 
own experience as a designer and based 
on (auto)biographical descriptions of the 
process by extraordinary practitioners (e.g., 
Zumthor 1999), it can be suggested that ar-
chitects commonly have rather suggestive, 
lifelike, intensive (bodily) feelings when 
imagining the spaces they are designing, 
in resonance with imagined atmospheric 
qualities. accordingly, a neuroscientific, or 
better yet, neurophenomenological inves-
tigation of the design process may bring 
forward the awareness about the bodily and 
emotional processes involved in (pre-)re-
flective experiences of “living” the designs. 
Hence, design research with reference to 
second-order cybernetics principles (§22) 
could help to distinguish the participant’s 
dimension – how an exchange of different 
observational positions occurs (i.e., imag-
ining experience from the position of the 
user and one’s own as a designer), how such 
switching is incorporated into the conversa-
tion with the medium in which the designer 
works, and ultimately, in what manner such 
an observer’s awareness could be intro-
duced to teaching design and facilitating 
the learning process.
« 6 » Following the target article’s con-
vincing argument for the necessary shift in 
understanding science as a design-like ac-
tivity (§§13f), a concrete illustration can be 
offered in the context of the neuroscience-
architecture inquiry. if design research is 
understood as a variety of second-order cy-
bernetic practice, then this kind of interdis-
ciplinary experimental work encounters a 
particular observer issue: who is a designer 
here – an architect or a scientist? Currently, 
the majority of neuroscientific investiga-
tions are one-sided, i.e., led and conceived 
primarily by cognitive scientists, with little 
or no support from the architectural side. 
in such a situation, designing experimental 
setups, involving the creation of architec-
tural environments, is guided more by the 
requirements of scientific methods than by 
architectural purposes. Thus, the validity of 
resulting evidence can be questioned on the 
basis of its appropriateness and usability in 
design. For this reason, there is a need to 
strategize such an interdisciplinary endea-
vour by establishing a framework for the 
new second-order science (see, for instance, 
the proposal by Hugo alrøe and Egon noe 
2014), which should include careful re-
thinking of the participants’ roles in rela-
tion to their disciplinary perspectives, ex-
pertise, and corresponding impact on study 
outcomes. in other words, there is a need 
for self-reflexivity and differentiation ac-
cording to the observer (architect or scien-
tist), in the spirit of second-order cybernet-
ics and science, as indicated in §15 and §30.
« 7 » to illustrate further the paral-
lels between design research and (second-
order) cybernetics (§23), this last point 
considers the overlap between the notion 
of cognitive-science-cum-phenomenology 
providing a genuine second-order science 
(for a detailed account, see vörös 2014) and 
the proposal by sweeting (§26) of second-
order science being a potential point of in-
terchange between design and science. in 
the context of neuroscience-architecture 
dialogue, sebastjan vörös’s argument can 
be transformed into a cognitive science-
cum-phenomenology of architectural ex-
perience and design, where the latter refers 
to a longstanding tradition of architectural 
phenomenology and the above-mentioned 
phenomenological descriptions of archi-
tects’ works and design thinking (classi-
cal examples including Holl, Pallasmaa & 
Pérez-Gómez 2006; Pallasmaa 2005). in 
parallel, current efforts to provide a system-
atic conceptual framework for the complex 
bio-cultural nature of architectural experi-
ence prevalently belong to the enactive-em-
bodied understanding of cognition (see, for 
instance, Jelić 2015; Jelić et al. 2016; riet-
veld 2016; rietveld & Kiverstein 2014). tak-
en all together, a new second-order science 
of interdisciplinary design research can be 
conceived of as a conversational framework 
between the enactive-embodied approach 
and the phenomenology of architectural 
experience and design, which focuses on 
the interdisciplinary research itself. Thus, 
its aim is to identify and establish a plau-
sible pathway of exchange between neuro-
science and architecture – that is, to create 
a communicative space, a “trans-domain” 
where scientific and designerly research 
may converge (Jonas 2015a: 34). accord-
ingly, the architect’s ways of knowing might 
be able organically to incorporate alterna-
tive approaches to life-world perspectives, 
in this case, one that is enactive-embodied 
and evidence-based, and thus strengthen in 
turn the architectural mode of structuring 
and representing the world.
« 8 » Finally, the value of target article 
in the context of constructivist approaches 
more broadly, can be particularly empha-
sized in terms of its pertinence to address-
ing problems beyond cybernetics – more 
specifically, in the domain of enactivism as 
related to architecture – by indicating a way 
of structuring interdisciplinary research and 
thus tackling one of the key issues of design 
research in the age of neuroscience.
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Author’s response 
beyond Application
Ben Sweeting
> Upshot • I reinforce the idea of broad 
connections between cybernetics, de-
sign and science that become apparent 
when the messy processes implicit in 
each are reflected on more explicitly. In 
so doing, I treat design not as a field in 
which cybernetic ideas are to be applied, 
but one in which they are reflected on 
and pursued.
« 1 » i wish to thank all commentators 
for their stimulating contributions. The first 
thing to note in response to these seven 
commentaries is the range of ground they 
cover, indicating the wide potential of the 
relation between cybernetics and design re-
search to inform both fields. it is significant 
that many of the aspects raised by comment-
ers are focused on core topics of cybernetic 
research: computing technology (Mateus van 
stralen; Christiane herr); cognition (Andrea 
Jelić); and, broadly, the relationship between 
research/theory and action/practice, which 
is a focus of herr and Michael hohl, and un-
derlies the concerns of Jose Cabral, Dai grif-
fiths and tom scholte. as Karl Müller (2010) 
has noted, there is a need to focus on core 
topics in order to reinforce the coherence 
of radical constructivism (rC) and second-
order cybernetics (soC) as a research field. 
Müller’s remarks could be taken as a call for 
a turn away from topics such as design that 
have been prominent in recent cybernetics. 
These commentaries, and the research to 
which they point, suggest that design may 
instead offer a focus in which a number of 
such core issues can be explored.
« 2 » in this context, scholte’s intro-
duction to the work of ann and Lawrence 
Halprin may be valuable even beyond the 
project of connecting cybernetics-inspired 
discussions in design and theatre stud-
ies (see also scholte’s target article in this 
issue). Building connections such as this 
would seem to be a way to help broaden the 
relationship of cybernetics with both de-
sign and theatre beyond one of application, 
releasing their potential to explore central 
cybernetic concerns through practice (cf. 
Müller 2010: 36f).
« 3 » of the commentaries, those of 
griffiths and Cabral put forward the most ex-
plicit questions, and i therefore concentrate 
on these below. in line with my approach in 
the target article, i have attempted to remain 
focused primarily on how issues raised in 
design can contribute to questions in cyber-
netics.
ill-defined problems
« 4 » griffiths (§8) suggests that the ac-
count of design that i have given applies 
to a particular subset of design, whereas 
at least some other areas of design deal 
with well-defined problems. some design 
tasks or components of design tasks are, 
indeed, characterised by more constrained 
problems than others. Yet even apparently 
clear and familiar design tasks regularly 
involve incomplete criteria or contestable 
premises, and a clearly-defined goal is no 
guarantee of a well-defined problem (cf. 
griffiths §6). This is because design is always 
concerned with the new (target article §8), 
which is the case even when designers are 
not attempting to be especially innovative 
(that is, when we design a building, we are 
concerned with creating something new 
even when we stick to an established typol-
ogy). This can be seen within the scope of 
the definition that griffiths (§5) cites: the 
process of preparing a plan for construct-
ing something is not solely a matter of 
setting out production information (the 
working drawings and specifications that 
will guide manufacture) but of devising 
what is proposed in these. This process in-
volves forms of reflective, conversational 
activity whenever such a plan is considered 
in more than arbitrary terms (that is to say, 
when it is designed).
« 5 » take, for instance, some of the 
questions posed in the design of a new mo-
torway (an example within the compass of 
engineering, and one to which Horst rittel 
and Melvin Webber refer, rittel & Web-
ber 1973: 163). different configurations 
of road junctions will be both better and 
worse according to different terms of refer-
ence. Even considering only the efficiency of 
traffic flow, there will be trade offs between 
congestion at different points in the road 
system. There are also many other relevant 
criteria, such as, for instance: safety, other 
road users, cost, construction sequencing, 
maintenance, noise pollution, air quality 
and impact on natural habitats. While these 
criteria are mostly easily recognisable, they 
are not all commensurable with each other, 
such that there is no one way to resolve de-
finitively between them, nor is it possible to 
optimise against an overall goal without this 
being distorting. Further, the interactions 
between these different criteria and the limi-
tations they set on each other in the specific 
situation that is at hand only become clear 
as particular solutions are developed, dis-
cussed and enacted. taking a broader scope, 
one might also challenge the premises un-
der which the project is advanced: having 
explored the likely consequences of the new 
motorway, we may take a different view on 
whether it is a worthwhile project and con-
sider alternative options instead.
« 6 » While such situations resist ex-
haustive analysis and conventional linear 
problem solving, designers deal with them 
as a matter of course and without regard-
ing them as being problematic. in so do-
ing, they develop and refine not just their 
design proposals but also the questions to 
which these proposals respond. indeed, as 
nigel Cross (2007a: 100) points out, de-
signers treat even well-formed problems 
as if they are ill-defined, an approach that 
has the benefits of testing the assumptions 
that are given at the outset and searching 
for new opportunities.
« 7 » griffiths (§6) gives two counter 
examples – those of scientific and musi-
cal instruments – where questions are very 
tightly constrained. indeed, these situations 
are so constrained that they might well not 
be considered as instances of design activity 
in that they respond to a plan rather than 
create one. The musical instrument exam-
ple, which is perhaps better understood in 
terms of craft, is closely related to the ex-
isting tradition of musical performance 
in which each instrument must be usable. 
These constraints can, however, be under-
stood as a result of a wider design process, 
one where the configuration of the musi-
cal instrument has co-evolved slowly over 
several generations together with the tradi-
tions of musical performance to which it is 
related (this is comparable in architecture 
to the development of a vernacular tradi-
tion). The development of scientific instru-
ments can be thought of, similarly, as blur-
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ring with that of scientific experimentation 
itself, as is reflected in accounts of scientific 
practice (target article §10). What is learnt 
in experiments using the instruments gen-
erates new criteria for further experiments 
and so new or refined instruments. Thus 
we can think of this as one overall process, 
which we could characterise either in terms 
of science or design, encompassing scien-
tific experimentation and the construction 
of the instruments that support this.
« 8 » griffiths (§8) asks the question of 
to what extent an soC account of design 
can be convincing to those that do not 
share its epistemological position. i do not 
see this as a question of different design 
epistemologies but of different degrees of 
explicitness about the epistemology that is 
acted out in design, and different ways of 
making this explicit. What designers do in 
practice is not always what they describe 
themselves as doing, as discussed by herr 
and hohl. it is in retrospect that the paths 
taken seem clear and, as it is this clarity that 
is what designers need to communicate, the 
messy process by which this clarity is de-
veloped usually remains unremarked on. 
Making these sorts of processes explicit is a 
core concern of design research and some-
thing to which soC can contribute. The 
purpose of this is not, as i see it, to recon-
figure design practice in some specific way. 
rather, articulating what would otherwise 
remain tacit helps maintain what is already 
special about design (including attitudes 
towards values, as raised by both herr §2 
and hohl §§7f), something that can other-
wise become lost.
« 9 » This relation of soC to design 
practice in terms of making the implicit 
explicit may, as griffiths (§8) suggests, in-
form how soC might be advanced more 
generally. Cybernetic processes are im-
plicit in everyday life and, as with design, 
making these processes explicit reinforces 
what is special about them, which can oth-
erwise become lost in the context of other 
concerns. Looked at in these terms, soC’s 
relation to practice is not limited to where 
its epistemological position is explicitly 
shared. it can enjoy a broad relation to 
practice in terms of implicitly cybernetic 
processes, while still contesting the ways in 
which particular practices are convention-
ally understood.
Material agency and viability
« 10 » griffiths points out tensions be-
tween rC and andrew Pickering’s (1995) 
account of material agency. as griffiths (§11) 
notes, there is not necessarily a conflict here 
and it seems to me that such tensions can be 
defused, or at least sharpened to more pre-
cisely the points at issue.
« 11 » This is supported by the case of 
design, which while constructivist in orien-
tation is compatible with ideas of material 
agency, even if this was not emphasised in 
my account. This is both in terms of the me-
dia with which designers think and the tech-
nologies and industries with and in which 
they work:
  Media plays an active role in how de-
signers work. it is important to how they 
deal with complexity (Gedenryd 1998), 
model the material and spatial (sweet-
ing 2011), and construct new possi-
bilities (the process of sketching that 
ranulph Glanville 2006a, 2007c empha-
sises is one that needs to be embodied 
in media of some kind). This includes 
the digital technologies discussed by 
van stralen, as well as the more obvious 
materiality of the analogue. accounts of 
the active role of instruments in science, 
such as that given by Pickering (1995), 
can be read as if referring to the design 
studio (target article §10).
  What is materially and technologically 
feasible is a crucial constraint on what 
designers propose. This is especially the 
case where designers try to use materials 
in forms to which they are particularly 
suited, as can be summarised by archi-
tect Louis Kahn’s oft-quoted conversa-
tion with a brick – “You say to a brick, 
‘What do you want, brick?’ and brick 
says to you, ‘i like an arch.’ and you say 
to brick, ‘Look, i want one, too, but arch-
es are expensive and i can use a concrete 
lintel.’ and then you say: ‘What do you 
think of that, brick?’ Brick says: ‘i like an 
arch’.”1 as well as this material-focused 
approach, material agency can be seen 
in the way that technological changes 
have transformed the nature of mate-
rial constraints (discussed by van stralen 
1 | https://www.theguardian.com/artand-
design/2013/feb/26/louis-kahn-brick-whisperer-
architect
§§2, 4), and it remains an important fac-
tor even where design approaches are 
focused elsewhere.
« 12 » The principle move in rC is to 
change the orientation of epistemology from 
a concern with how we know (or do not 
know) about any real world beyond our ex-
perience, to a focus on this experience itself. 
This relocates epistemology to the realm 
of experience, in which (our experience 
of) the material is important to include (as 
is evident in design). While, therefore, rC 
can be contrasted with the material where 
this is meant in the sense of the real, there 
is no conflict between rC and our material 
experience. indeed, the latter can be encom-
passed in the notion of viability, which is 
central to Ernst von Glasersfeld’s account. 
rC is not a licence for unconstrained con-
struction. von Glasersfeld (1990) gives the 
example of not being able to walk through 
a desk, and thus being unable to maintain 
a viable idea of the world that would allow 
him to do this. This is an example of a mate-
rial condition in which we experience epis-
temological, not just practical, resistance.
« 13 » von Glasersfeld sometimes re-
ferred to viability in terms of “fit.” in rC, 
this is in the sense of “fitting with” or evolu-
tionary fit, and so perhaps better phrased in 
terms of the elimination of the unfit. There 
is no sense of correspondence to the real 
and much room for contradictory explana-
tions to be viable in our experience at dif-
ferent times. This is not to be confused with 
the athlete’s notion of fit, of an idea becom-
ing fitter and fitter in the sense of a closer 
match to the goal of the real. in this latter 
view, while it may still be acknowledged 
that we do not have access to the real, our 
experience is claimed to be a good guide to 
it in any case because of the constraints that 
are imposed on it, thus returning to a corre-
spondence view of epistemology. The main 
point at issue here is, as i see it, not about 
material agency per se but whether this is 
understood in terms of the real or in the 
realm of experience, and about how this is 
then put to work epistemologically.
« 14 » similarly to what i have said 
above regarding the relation between soC 
and design, i think that rC is agile enough 
to engage with the material and the perfor-
mative across the “whole range of scientific 
and design activities” (griffiths §11), while 
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also contesting what is at stake epistemolog-
ically in these. indeed, rC can help provide 
the honesty that Glanville (2014c) suggests 
will efface the differences between different 
research traditions (target article §14; and as 
expanded on by hohl).
Designing systems
« 15 » Cabral’s call for an increased focus 
on the systemic nature of objects is some-
thing that i support. The issue as i see it, and 
as Cabral (§3) points to, comes back to what, 
especially in architecture, is a surprising gulf 
between theories regarding how we under-
stand, on the one hand, what is designed 
and, on the other, the process through which 
design occurs. recent work has addressed 
this in part by seeing architecture in terms of 
its place within the building industry (Lloyd 
Thomas, amhoff & Beech 2016). From the 
vantage point of soC, there are further, 
more designerly opportunities for bridg-
ing between these areas. The work of Jelić 
is significant in this regard, establishing an 
account of architectural experience in com-
mensurable terms to constructivist accounts 
of design practice. i have previously sug-
gested there is potential in connecting con-
versational accounts of design with conver-
sational accounts of architectural experience 
(sweeting 2011), while in the context of the 
target article one can also understand par-
ticular examples such as the Fun Palace as 
being part of soC enquiry not just resulting 
from it (Cabral §9; Jelić §4; sweeting 2015a).
« 16 » The building of such bridges does 
not, however, guarantee in what manner 
they will be crossed. in making the argument 
in the target article – that design is a form of 
soC even where soC is not explicitly refer-
enced – it was important for me to refer to 
work in design beyond figures such as Ce-
dric Price, nicholas negroponte and John 
Frazer, who were explicitly influenced by cy-
bernetic ideas. My reference to Peter Eisen-
man is not therefore intended to validate his 
architecture but to point to the formal simi-
larities between his work and second-order 
science (sos) that are of interest whatever 
we think of his proposals. indeed, the sort 
of critiques put forward by Cabral and oth-
ers, such as that of robin Evans (1985), may 
inform how sos and soC can be developed: 
as Cabral (§8) puts it, “it is not enough to be 
self-reflexive and simply engaged to explore 
the full potential of being an soC observer.” 
The question of how to design such systems 
is an open one, and a topic on which design 
research and cybernetics might collaborate.
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